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Foreword

T

his Dean’s Report celebrates our law school’s storied past. Over
the past 125 years, Chicago-Kent has graduated students who would
later become leading jurists, trial lawyers, and heads of corporations
and not-for-profits, not only here in the United States but around the world.
Graduates have also served as governors, as members of Congress, as legal
service lawyers, and in a wide variety of other public interest capacities.
In our first generation, we proudly opened our doors to minorities who
were denied a legal education elsewhere. And we have contributed to legal
education with a series of innovations, from introducing computers into
legal instruction to developing the first three-year required curriculum for
legal writing, and from establishing the first fee-generating clinical program
in the nation to launching an incubator for recent graduates interested in
practicing law on their own. Our programs in intellectual property, advocacy, and law and the workplace have few peers.
We also have been blessed with fabulous faculty members, a number of
whom have marked the occasion of our anniversary by exploring some of the
continuities and discontinuities in the legal terrain spanning the lifetime of
the school. I trust you will enjoy their musings, and I look forward to working with all of you as we embark on the next, even-more-terrific 125 years.

Dean Harold J. Krent
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Introduction

W

hen students entered the chambers of Judge Joseph Meade Bailey
in 1888 for the educational adventure that was later to become
known as Chicago-Kent College of Law, they were surrounded
by volumes of legal cases, but finding precedents was hit or miss since no one
had yet created an indexing system. Chatter inside the chambers might have
centered on the infamous “Great Boodle Trial,” one of the first public corruption trials in Chicago, or the new Rookery Building being built just a block
north on LaSalle Street. More serious discussion might have turned to basic
questions about the Constitution and the highest court of the land. Should
the Bill of Rights be applied to the States? Should everyone have the right to
have their cases heard by the U.S. Supreme Court?
Outside the judge’s chambers, students were faced with a world of new
technologies (the telegram, the portable camera, skyscraping architecture)
and fast-evolving legal questions. Rapid industrialization and the monopolistic tendencies of major enterprises, particularly the railroads centered in
the Midwest, were pushing Congress towards the passage of a pathbreaking
“anti-trust” law. Women were permitted to enroll in the early law classes held
in Judge Bailey’s chambers, and they were increasingly involved in providing
legal aid to the poor through the Protective Agency for Women and Children
but were denied the right to sit on juries. And while Albert Goodwill Spalding, owner of the Chicago White Stockings, and John Montgomery Ward,
the nation’s most famous shortstop, were battling over player labor issues,
post–Civil War tensions were still simmering in a scandalous case that pitted
California against the President.
Since those early classes in the late nineteenth century, IIT Chicago-Kent
graduates have mastered the law and served their clients in all 50 states and
around the world. They have joined big firms, formed their own firms, created businesses, been appointed to the bench, served as legislators, argued
in the Supreme Court, joined the media, and won awards for their ideas and
their representation. They have changed the law and changed the world. And
now, 125 years after the law school was founded, we celebrate the tenacity
and success of this great Chicago institution and its alumni with tales spanning 125 years of law and change.

Professors Lori Andrews and Sarah Harding
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“The Boodle Aldermen: Each sat in his particular oven,” cartoon by Art Young, 1892.

CHICAGO’S “GREAT BOODLE TRIAL”
Todd Haugh

I

n late August 1887, as some of
Chicago-Kent College of Law’s
first students were beginning
their studies in the chambers of
Judge Joseph Bailey, a bottle carrying
a handwritten note bobbed across
Lake Michigan. Found on the shores
of Grand Haven, Michigan, the bottle and its contents were rushed to
a reporter for the then-fledgling
Chicago Daily Tribune newspaper.
Thrilled to have scooped the competition, the Tribune published the
note the next day as an exclusive:
To my friends in Chicago: A
few more hours and I will be safe
through the straits and in Canada.

Sheriff Matson, please accept my
thanks for the bath, but I have
concluded it in British waters. Oh
Ed, I wish you were here with me!
Goodbye till we meet!

The note’s author was William
J. McGarigle, and he had reason to
gloat. A former Cook County Commissioner and warden of the Cook
County Hospital, McGarigle had
successfully fled police custody after being convicted on corruption
charges and sentenced to three years
in prison. McGarigle escaped by
duping the Sheriff of Cook County,
Canute Matson, into allowing him a
visit with his wife and kids at their

Todd Haugh

Lakeview home. After asking to take
a bath to “freshen up,” McGarigle
slipped out a window, made his
way to a schooner docked along the
south branch of the Chicago River,
and sailed out into the lake and
through the Straits of Mackinaw to
Canadian waters.
Slipping past the patrol boats,
knowing he was about to be a free
man (Canada had no extradition
treaty with the U.S. at the time), McGarigle must have chuckled as he
threw the bottle overboard. When
found, the note would not only put
a thorn in the backside of Matson
and the entire sheriff ’s office, but it
would surely put a smile on the face
of his friend, Edward McDonald.
The “Ed” from the note, McDonald
was McGarigle’s co-defendant, fellow county commissioner, and now
former cellmate. Keeping McDonald
in good spirits hadn’t been easy as
the summer humidity in their cells
climbed and a transfer to the Joliet
Penitentiary loomed, but McGarigle
did his best. The truth was, Ed McDonald’s happiness mattered. As a
longtime board member and the
Cook County Hospital’s engineer,
he knew every detail of the swindles that landed them and the other
county commissioners in jail. But
more importantly, he was brother to
Michael “Big Mike” or “King Mike”
McDonald, boss of the Chicago
Democratic Machine and the city’s
first politician gangster.

5

McGarigle, Ed McDonald, and
Big Mike McDonald form the nucleus of a fantastic story of proudly
corrupt politicians, seemingly righteous reformers, bagmen, kidnappers, and suckered citizens, revealed
through the testimony of the “Great
Boodle Trial” of 1887. The “most
sensational corruption scandal of
the late nineteenth century,” the
Boodle Trial offers a glimpse into
the crooked machine politics of
early Chicago and the equally underhanded tactics of overzealous
reformers. Called by some a “corrective antidote” to “[a]n epidemic of
fraud,” the trial helped galvanize the
reform movement in Chicago, proving that even well-connected Chicago politicians could be brought to
justice. At the same time, it demonstrated the lengths—some say necessary; others say illegal—reformers would go in the pursuit of their
goals. Finally, the trial reminds us of
just how entrenched corruption is in
Chicago politics. As dramatic as it
was at the time, the trial may have
been the beginning, not the end, of
Chicago’s legacy of corruption.

C

hicago’s Great Boodle Trial,
which began on June 4, 1887, was
actually two “prolonged and tedious
trials.” The first trial pitted State’s
Attorney Julius Grinnell against
McGarigle and Ed McDonald; the
second was against over a dozen
other commissioners and private
contractors in an “omnibus” pro-
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ceeding. Both cases centered around
the same allegations of public corruption. According to prosecutors, a
ring of crooked commissioners took
control of the Cook County Board
sometime in the early 1880s. If a
company wanted to do business with
the county, it had to pay the ring a
“commission” for the privilege.
What we today call a “pay to play”
scheme, this arrangement allowed
dishonest commissioners and business owners to get rich off county
contracts secured through bribes
and inflated by padded invoices. Ed
McDonald helped organize the ring
and set up the schemes, while McGarigle, acting as the bagman, collected the bribes and kickbacks—the
“boodle.” Everything led back to Big
Mike McDonald, the man who controlled Chicago’s Democratic Party,
all county patronage, and the county
board.
A sampling of the boodlers and
their schemes, recounted in vivid
detail through the two trials, shows
the power of early Chicago machine
politics and the depth of the commissioners’ individual greed. There
was Harry “Prince Hal” Varnell,
a gambler and saloon owner appointed warden of the Cook County
Insane Asylum. Varnell promptly set
up a private office and home on the
grounds of the asylum and outfitted them with “Persian rugs, Brussels carpets, and lace curtains.” He
ordered expensive foods and paid
for the living expenses of his neph-

ews, cousins, and friends, all using
taxpayer money. The asylum’s drug
store and infirmary served as the
“clubhouse” for the ring of commissioners.
James “Buck” McCarthy joined
the county board in 1884. A high
school dropout, former boxer, and
meat packer in the Chicago stockyards, McCarthy’s main qualification
for being a commissioner was his
friendship with Big Mike McDonald. McCarthy’s protégé was Charles
Lynn, who served as a deputy sheriff
and commissioner. Lynn admitted
to joining the board “solely for the
money he could extort,” recounting
his “scorn” for Chicago industrialists
who refused to pay the ring its expected commissions. Charles Frey,
another McDonald-controlled commissioner, was warden of the county
poorhouse. He bought silk underwear costing eighty-five dollars,
charging it to the county as a bale of
muslin.
And then there was McGarigle.
Warden of the county’s 600-bed hospital for the poor, McGarigle’s office
was adorned in the finest imported
damask drapes. China spittoons
flanked his office door. He even had
a private horse stable built on hospital grounds for his personal use. In
one of the more farcical accounts, it
was reported that McGarigle had 24
lightning rods mounted on a hospital tool shed—one “on every chimney, every alcove, every corner, and
every crevice.” The lightning rods

Todd Haugh
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Several men sitting on benches along a hallway in the Cook County Hospital, 1911, DN-0008937, Chicago
Daily News negatives collection, Chicago History Museum.

were installed by Varnell, a business
agent of the manufacturer.
As the boodlers siphoned off tax
dollars to fund their lavish offices
and private dinners, county patients
suffered. In the Cook County Hospital’s contagious disease ward, “a
cramped, fetid, 18-by-40-foot room,”
patients fought for space on only
six beds, often lying side by side on
the floor. Unlike the $3.00-a-dozen
strawberries and grapes Varnell ordered for his party guests at the clubhouse, patients were served spoiled
meat. The nurses and orderlies often
showed up to work drunk. Similar
conditions were found at the asylum
and the poorhouse. Newspapers reported that “the poor, the lunatics,
and the sick have fared none too
well, but those who have been hired
to take care of them live in luxury.”

N

ot surprisingly, the boodlers’
largess eventually garnered
notice. In 1886, the county budget
faced a staggering one million dollar
deficit (approximately 25 million in
today’s dollars), which was directly
tied to the reckless spending of the
corrupt commissioners. This rallied
the few reform-minded commissioners on the county board, including J. Frank Aldrich, who was also a
member of the reform-based Union
League Club of Chicago. The Union
League Club joined causes with the
Citizens’ Association, another reform group, whose membership included George Pullman, one of the
wealthiest and most powerful industrialists in the country. Pullman
and the other reformers brought suit
against the county board to enjoin
it from entering into more dubious
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contracts—the first was to drill an
unnecessary artisan well at the poorhouse—thereby beginning the “reform movement in county affairs.”
Despite the laudable goal of
ending the “epidemic of fraud” in
county politics, the reformers were
not exactly above reproach in their
tactics. In fact, some of the reformers’ methods rivaled those of the
boodlers. After filing their civil
suit, the reformers funded a private
prosecution of the ring of commissioners. Of the $150,000 raised
(over three and a half million dollars today), at least $30,000 went to
the Mooney and Boland Detective
Agency for the purpose of reviewing county invoices and conducting
nonstop surveillance of county contractors suspected of paying bribes.
When the invoices the detectives
had access to didn’t show evidence of
bribes, the reformers had ones that
did stolen from a county safe. The
“confiscated” documents helped lead
to a raid on the commissioners’ clubhouse, which uncovered additional incriminating evidence.
Now all the reformers needed
was a witness. A corrupt contractor, a plumber named Nic Schneider, gave the reformers what they
were after. Drinking one night at Big
Mike McDonald’s four-story Clark
Street gambling parlor and saloon,
“The Store,” Schneider loudly toasted
to “county contracts,” saying, “I am
rich and by gracious in two years I
shall be as rich as anybody.” Joining

him in the toast was a county commissioner. Two Mooney and Boland
detectives, who had been surveilling
Schneider, witnessed the toast.
When Schneider left the tavern, the
detectives followed. Schneider never
made it home that night. Disappearing with him were his business papers, including the false invoices he
wrote to pad county contracts and
evidence of the commissions he paid
to secure county work.
The ring of commissioners
learned through their own private
detectives that Schneider was being
held by the reformers. Based on a
bogus warrant issued for Schneider’s arrest, the commissioners sent
nine policemen to recapture him,
but they were turned away after a
struggle. Schneider, possibly bound
and gagged in a second floor room,
could hear the “ruckus” below as the
men fought over him. He turned
witness for the prosecution soon
after and fled out of state, escorted
(some might say restrained) by two
private detectives.
The reformers may have felt justified using such tactics to secure
evidence against the boodlers given
their control over the jury system.
At the time, the grand jury—the
only body that could issue an indictment formally charging a defendant
with a serious crime—was selected
by the county commissioners. Each
commissioner wrote two names of
prospective jurors on blank cards,
which were then drawn from a hat.

Todd Haugh

When a new grand jury was chosen,
one of the corrupt commissioners
simply picked cards that had been
dog-eared by the others in the ring.
This system, though rudimentary,
had been used effectively to shield
machine politicians from prosecution for over a decade. In fact, when
asked about the possibility of indictment, Buck McCarthy commented,
“There are only two powers over the
[county] board, one is the Almighty,
the other the grand jury, and we get
to draw the grand jury.”
McCarthy’s confidence was misplaced, however. After reformist
commissioner Aldrich witnessed the
loaded draw, the reformers were able
to convince a judge to empanel a
special grand jury. The special grand
jurors, “honest and true men who
refused to be bribed or intimidated,”
promptly indicted the ring of commissioners and private contractors
on 106 counts of public corruption.
The reformers had thus broken the
“power of puppet master [Big Mike]
McDonald and his commissioners
to control the selection of grand juries that had protected them from
criminal indictments.”
After unsuccessfully moving for
a change of venue on the grounds
that the prosecution had been improperly funded by private citizens,
the Boodle Trial was underway. The
evidence against McGarigle and
Ed McDonald was overwhelming.
“Witness after witness was placed
on the stand to prove that [they] had
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systematically robbed the taxpayers of this county for a long time.”
Plumber Nic Schneider became the
prosecution’s star. Notwithstanding
accusations of perjury by the defendants, Schneider’s testimony, supported by his false invoices, showed
that Ed McDonald was connected
with four firms that overcharged the
county for goods and labor and that
McGarigle collected and disbursed
the bribes and stolen money. Both
defendants testified in their own defense but offered contradictory testimony “of the flimsiest character.”
On June 18, 1887, the jury found
both men guilty. Later that summer,
the “other dominoes fell” during the
omnibus trial. When the verdicts
were read, “the ball game at White
Stocking Park was interrupted while
the people cheered.” The penalties
for most defendants were substantial, ranging from thousands of
dollars in fines to three years in the
penitentiary for McGarigle and Ed
McDonald. However, a few received
smaller fines after agreeing to help
the prosecution and paying restitution. Buck McCarthy, who was fined
just $1,000 amid allegations that he
had influence over one of the jurors, told reporters that he was “disappointed and disgusted” with the
verdict. (McCarthy went on to be
elected to the Chicago City Council.)
Of course, McGarigle’s flight to
Canada meant he was never fully
brought to justice. After living in
Banff, British Columbia, for two

10
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years, where he bought into a livery
business and invested in a hotel, he
cut a deal and returned to Chicago.
He eventually ran a tavern in the
Clark Street vice district controlled
by Big Mike McDonald. Ed McDonald didn’t fare as well. While awaiting
transfer to the penitentiary, his nineyear-old son died after falling from a
fire escape at the Cook County Hospital while playing with friends. The

Assistant State’s Attorney John Bensley explained it this way: “In Mike
McDonald’s case, an indictment
could not be framed to hold. When
a man lays all his plans coolly and deliberately with the express purpose,
apparently, of preventing any tracing
of crookedness to his door it is an extremely difficult thing to get him with
legal evidence.” Big Mike explained it
a little differently, though the senti-

fall was caused by loose boards that
hospital workers had failed to secure
or seal off. Afterward, Ed McDonald
“lapsed into a deep depression.” He
served his time in Joliet but was effectively finished in Chicago politics.
And what of Big Mike McDonald, the boss of the boodlers and the
architect of their schemes? He was
never charged or tried as part of the
Boodle Trial; the grand jury didn’t
even vote on whether to indict him.

ment was the same. Joking to reporters, he said, “[A]fter it’s all over I show
’em a pretty clean pair of heels and I’ll
do it this time or I’m very much mistaken.” He added, “Most everybody’s
a boodler nowadays, you know.”
Big Mike McDonald remained on
top of the Democratic Party for more
than a decade longer, controlling an
empire of gambling parlors, saloons,
and prostitution houses, while directing city and county patronage.
The Boodle Trial did not slow his operations. The same year of the trial, he
was reported to have ordered city aldermen under his control to approve

“The Boodlers Convicted,” New York Times headline, June 19, 1887. Facing: Photo of Michael “Big
Mike” McDonald and another man, 1907, DN0005146, Chicago Daily News negatives collection,
Chicago History Museum.
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a $200,000 contract for applying
“preserving fluid” to City Hall. The
fluid, which was
“guaranteed to
keep the stately
building intact
for a hundred
years,” washed
away in the rain
two days later.
The World’s Fair
that took place in
Chicago in 1893
put more millions into Big Mike McDonald’s pockets as city contracts
swelled and armies of tourists gambled and drank at The Store. It was at
this time that McDonald supposedly
coined the phrase, “There’s a sucker
born every minute.” Big Mike retired
to his Ashland Boulevard mansion in
the early 1900s, content to let the next
generation of boodlers and gangsters
try its hand in Chicago.

T

he legacy of the Great Boodle
Trial and the reform efforts it
epitomized is decidedly mixed. In
some ways, it was a significant victory for early Chicago reformers.
The Boodle Trial was a very public
demonstration that the city’s machine politicians—at least most of
them—were not above the law. All
told, nine commissioners and county
contractors who faced trial were
convicted and sentenced to two
years or more in jail; four others were
convicted and fined the maximum
allowed under statute. Up to that
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time, no politician had received such
harsh punishment for “boodling.”
The commissioners’ convictions,
even for those
receiving only
fines, also meant
they would be
automatically removed from the
county board.
By “turn[ing] the
rascals out of
the County Board and brand[ing]
them forever as convicted public
swindlers,” the trial ended most of
the commissioners’ political careers,
and more importantly, Big Mike McDonald’s control over county contracts. The Tribune called the trial
“the most successful assault on public crooks to that date.”
More broadly, the trial and the
scandal leading up to it galvanized
Chicago’s reform-minded citizens,
kick-starting the city’s reform movement. To successfully investigate
and prosecute the ring of commissioners, two reformist groups—the
Union League Club and the Citizens’
Association—joined forces. The alliance brought activist industrialists,
politicians, and judges together, and
allowed for great sums of money to
be raised to combat corruption. The
Boodle Trial was just the first success of the reformers. After the trial
ended, reformers pressured the state
legislature to review how jurors were
selected in Cook County, leading to

12
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a revamped jury system in which
county commissioners no longer
selected grand juries. This allowed
prosecutors to bring public corruption cases under a fair system. With
the help of a press corps intent on
publishing more exposés like those
leading up to the Boodle Trial, reformers went on to successfully investigate and prosecute bail-bond
fraud and ghost payrolling. Some of
these reform movements continue
today.
Yet, to achieve their goals, the
reformers became separated from
the corrupt commissioners by only
a matter of degree. While calling for
the prosecution of Big Mike McDonald—“the managing and directing
thief whose influence has cast such a
blighting shadow over public affairs in
this county”—reformers kidnapped
witnesses, stole documents from a
county safe, and privately funded the
criminal indictments of their adversaries. The reformers’ “ends justifies
the means” rationalization, which
they undoubtedly employed, rings
as hollow as McGarigle’s defense that
the prevailing system was at fault for
his crimes—that he just went along
with the boodling because everyone
else did. While there are safeguards
in place today to guard against the
use of such “impure methods,” many
contend the prosecutions of recent
Chicago politicians have been motivated less by enacting genuine reform and more by furthering political gain. One current Cook County

Commissioner, William Beavers,
awaiting trial for allegedly failing to
pay taxes on money he took from
his campaign fund (and used to
pay gambling losses, among other
things), has accused prosecutors of
indicting him as retribution for refusing to wear a wire against John
Daley, a former commissioner who
is brother to Richard Daley, Chicago’s longest-running mayor.
The best measure of the Boodle
Trial’s impact is, of course, whether
it changed the culture of corruption
in Chicago politics. On that score,
the trial has had little lasting impact.
The headlines of today’s Tribune
read much as they did 125 years ago.
Month after month, colorful Chicago
politicians fight indictment (some
from their county board seats) for
schemes that would get an approving
nod from Big Mike McDonald. Beavers is the most recent, and possibly
the most odd (after being indicted,
he called the United States Attorney
prosecuting him a “rooster with no
nuts”), but he is by no means alone.
On its way to earning the distinction of being the most corrupt city
in the country, Chicago has seen five
of its governors imprisoned, over 30
aldermen indicted and convicted,
and countless other public officials
investigated. At the top of that list is
former Governor Rod Blagojevich,
who is currently serving a 14-year
prison term for attempting to auction off President Barack Obama’s
vacant United States Senate seat for
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personal gain. Wiretaps of Blagojevich recorded him saying, “I’ve got
this thing and it’s f—ing golden, and
. . . I’m just not giving it up for f—in’
nothing.”
It could be argued that these
prosecutions even taking place,
some against officials at the highest
levels of government, proves that the
Boodle Trial has had a lasting impact—the trial showed generations
of reformers that political corruption
could be combated in Chicago in a
meaningful way. Others will more
cynically say that for every crooked
politician prosecuted, another will
take his place, and that the most
well-connected crooks—the crafty
bosses like Big Mike McDonald—always find a way to operate above the
law. While the truth is likely somewhere in between, the Great Boodle
Trial reminds us most of all that as
long as there is boodle, there will be
men trying to take it. As McGarigle
remarked a few months before his
conviction, “I don’t care if the same
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system prevailed in heaven, there
would be boodlers. The temptation is too great. . . . Men are but
human[.]” ◆
Sources and Further Reading

■ Richard C. Lindberg, The Gambler King of Clark
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Rookery Building, Historic American Buildings Survey, Library of Congress.

THE ROOKERY BUILDING
AND CHICAGO-KENT
A. Dan Tarlock

C

hicago-Kent traces its origin to the incorporation of
the Chicago College of Law in
1888. Chicago-Kent’s founding coincided with the opening of the Rookery Building, designed by the preeminent architectural firm of Burnham
and Root. There is a direct connection between the now iconic Rookery Building, located at Adams and
LaSalle, and the law school building
further west on Adams. There is also
a more indirect but interesting connection between the first and second
schools of Chicago architecture and
Daniel Burnham’s vision of the modern city. Architects, but especially
Daniel Burnham, helped make and

sustain Chicago as a world city, thus
making it an attractive and exciting
place to practice law to the benefit
of all law schools in Chicago including Chicago-Kent.
The Rookery is now a classic example of the first school of Chicago
architecture, which helped shape
modern Chicago and continues to
make Chicago a special place, despite decades of desecration of this
rich architectural heritage. The Great
Fire of 1871 destroyed the Loop and
the newly developed residential areas to the north. It did, however, narrowly miss the lumber yard, which
occupied the site of the current law
school. Architects were immediately

A. Dan Tarlock

attracted to Chicago because of the
opportunities to rebuild the city.
The skyscraper was perfected here,
and this technological innovation,
along with the telephone and Otis
Elevator, created the modern office
city by separating industrial production from its administration. By
1888, Chicago, along with Buenos
Aires and São Paulo, was emerging
as a major example of a modern city
unconstrained by any significant urban past. The city had grown from
about 100,000 persons when Lincoln was nominated for President,
a few blocks from the current law
school, to one million inhabitants
and counting.
Chicago had surpassed Philadelphia and became America’s second
city. Chicago’s location as a rail and
water hub enabled it to become the
processing center for the agricultural
bounty of the Midwest and Great
Plains as well as the distribution center for this region. For a brief period
of time, wealthy Chicagoans used
their new wealth and power to patronize a progressive group of architects to build modern, forward-looking cathedrals of commerce.
A group of Chicago architects,
led by Dankmar Adler, Louis Sullivan, John Root, Daniel Burnham
and later Frank Lloyd Wright, developed a distinctive style of architecture geared to the technological
innovations that were changing the
nature of business. The Rookery is
a perfect example. The walls were

15

partially load-bearing, but the interior used the state-of-the-art steel
frame, developed by William Jenny,
to permit it to become the tallest
building in Chicago. The building
is a mix of early modernist and retrospective styles. The walls of large
windows allowed maximum use of
light because of the dimness of the
20-watt bulbs powered by Commonwealth Edison’s first loop generating
station across the street. The exterior
building is also an example of Chicago Romanesque. This style, whose
distinctive feature was the arch, was
based on pre-Gothic Romanesque
architecture in southern France. Initially adopted by Frank Richardson
in Boston, the great Louis Sullivan
brought it to Chicago. The Auditorium
Theater, which opened in 1889, is
the best surviving example.
After the elite lost interest in
“modern architecture,” innovation
languished in Chicago until the
post–World War II modernist school
emerged. Until the 1980s, postwar
Chicago architecture was a monument to Mies van der Rohe. Fleeing
Nazi Germany, he ultimately settled
in Chicago, headed IIT’s then Department of Architecture, designed
its landmark campus, and more
generally helped make the German
Bauhaus the dominant form of post–
World War II Chicago architecture.
The law school’s current building,
which opened in 1992, is a synthesis
of the two great schools of Chicago
architecture. Its scale and facade re-
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“Rookery Building, exterior,” photo from 1891, Images of America Collection, Frances Loeb Library.

call the post-fire Prairie School, especially the Rookery Building. However, the incorporation of an arch
into early designs was rejected as disproportionate to the building. Not
only is it about the same height, it
was designed by Holabird and Root,
the successor firm to Burnham and
Root. The relatively austere stone
facade, rather than a pure steel and
glass frame characteristic of Mies’s
main campus buildings, echoes the
Rookery in both style and underlying philosophy. And, like the law, it
both respects the past and looks to
the future. Burnham rejected the argument of Louis Sullivan and Frank
Lloyd Wright that America needed
a distinctive style of architecture.
Rather, “Burnham and his allies,” as

the Encyclopedia of Chicago explains,
“believed that the sometimes frantic
quest for ‘American-ness’—the obsession with New World originality
and horror of all things European—
was itself a kind of insecurity, and
that maturity would consist in an
acknowledgment that America was
not culturally isolated from the rest
of the world. Burnham and his associates saw the United States as
a rightful heir to the traditions of
Western culture.”
Daniel Burnham’s larger legacy
for Chicago and its vibrant legal
community is twofold. First, Prairie
School architecture both symbolized
Chicago’s emergence as a world city
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by allowing it to drain
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the surrounding region of both resources and talent, legal and otherwise. This legacy along with Burnham’s partially realized 1909 plan
also helped Chicago to evolve into a
major financial center, after its original industrial base of Chicago eroded
after World War II. The concentration of law firms to serve Chicago’s
economy provided employment for
thousands of lawyers.
The second legacy of Burnham’s
plan is much darker but also benefitted Chicago lawyers. The much hailed
plan envisioned Chicago as a great
city in the mold of Paris or Imperial
Vienna. But the plan primarily concentrated on a magnificent core and
lakefront for the wealthy. The unruly, poor, polluted, and dangerous
rest of the city, home to the waves of
immigrants from around the world
and migrants from other parts of the
country, was depicted only by endless low-rise, uniform blocks. In other
words, the city that actually existed
was largely ignored. It was left to
others to deal with what was in fact
happening on the streets of Chicago.
In the twentieth century, Chicago’s
continuing attempts to deal with
urban problems such as racial segregation, urban poverty, substandard

17

housing, rampant corruption, and
juvenile and gang violence have
provided endless opportunities for
lawyers and future lawyers trying to
obtain justice for individuals caught
in the net of poverty, corruption,
brutality, and discrimination equally
characteristic of Chicago, including
a young Columbia University graduate (and Chicago-Kent commencement speaker), Barack Obama. ◆
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The Legal Aid Society, established in 1905 from a merger of PAWC and the Legal Aid Bureau, photo by
Charles J. Bernauer, 1919, ICHi-36161, Chicago History Museum.

INVENTING LEGAL AID:
WOMEN AND LAY LAWYERING
Felice Batlan

W

hen we think of extraordinary nineteenth century legal institutions
and innovations, we generally do
not think of women. In fact, in 1875,
the United States Supreme Court
ruled that Illinois’ refusal to admit
women to the bar did not violate the
newly passed Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Yet
remarkably, in 1885, women in Chicago created the Protective Agency
for Women and Children (PAWC),
which was one of the very first organizations in the country to provide
free legal aid to the poor.
The PAWC began inauspiciously

and indirectly. In 1876, Caroline
M. Brown, a wealthy woman and
mother of two children, founded
the Chicago Women’s Club (CWC)
by inviting 21 women to meet in
her living room to learn about and
discuss the day’s pressing social, political, and cultural issues. Brown
was acutely aware of the limited
sphere in which elite women could
maneuver respectably and worried
that some might take a dim view of
the club. Yet, in the aftermath of the
disastrous 1871 fire, Chicago was
a particularly hospitable place for
such a group, as women had created
organizations to provide charity and

Felice Batlan

relief to victims of the fire. Thus a
tradition of middle-class and elite
women’s organizing already was beginning to develop in Chicago.
One of the first projects of the
CWC was to place a woman night
matron in each police station, and
the club hired and raised funds for
the matron’s salary. The issue of having women police matrons was one
embraced by numerous women’s
organizations across the country. It
was an appropriate women’s issue because it involved the supervision of
working-class and poor women under the rationale of protecting such
women’s virtue from male prisoners
and from policemen (often immigrant men). Responsibility for the
matron gave CWC members cause
to visit the jails as well as to follow
jailed women’s cases through court
proceedings. They observed firsthand the treatment of poor women
and girls in Chicago courts as defendants, witnesses, and victims.
These experiences underlay the
CWC’s decision to create the Protective Agency for Women and Children in 1885. The PAWC announced
as its objective: “To secure justice for
women and children, to give legal
counsel free of charge, and to extend moral support to the wronged
and helpless.” Significant to notice
here is that the PAWC limited its
clientele to women. In fact, gender
was fundamental to how members
of the PAWC viewed themselves,
constructed their roles and du-
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ties, and defined the problems that
they sought to solve. According to
the PAWC, elite and middle-class
women had a unique responsibility
to protect poor and working-class
women from a host of dangers and
injustices. Central to the PAWC’s
ideology was the argument that
men as a whole had failed to create a
moral and just society. Instead, men
had constructed a world that was rife
with injustices to women and governed by a corrupt political system
in which men put self-interest before
the public good.
Charlotte Holt was hired by the
PAWC as the organization’s superintendent. She ran the office and interviewed women who sought aid. She
and her assistants, board members,
and volunteers then would investigate cases and attempt to settle them.
A male attorney would become involved only if a lawsuit was filed,
which was a rare event. Each year,
the number of clients to whom the
PAWC ministered grew exponentially.
In its first year, the PAWC handled
156 cases, in its third year 1,145, and
by 1905 over four thousand. There
were few rules regarding the types
of cases that the PAWC would take.
Rather it functioned flexibly and
often improvised, meeting needs as
they arose. Thus unlike the practice
of most later legal aid societies, the
PAWC did not have eligibility requirements, did not require that a
client be worthy, and was entirely
unconcerned that it might take cases
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away from attorneys. As the PAWC’s
superintendent stated, “We do not
make any rules, but judge of each
case as it comes to us.”
The two largest categories of
cases were wage claims involving
women whose employers had failed
to pay them and domestic relations
claims. In wage cases, Holt and other
board members, using their influence and persuasion through letters and personal visits, pressured
employers to pay such wages. This
form of conciliation was used so often that the PAWC dubbed it “White
Mailing.” The “white” was intended
to imply that it was done in the name
of justice, morality, and the public good, as opposed to blackmail,
which was done for self-interest.
The bulk of the PAWC’s domestic relations cases raised issues of
abandonment and/or nonsupport of
wives by husbands. These cases went
to the heart of the PAWC’s belief in
the absolute obligation of a husband
to support his wife and children. In
a typical case, a woman would appear at the PAWC’s office claiming
that her husband disappeared weeks
ago, leaving her penniless. Now the
landlord was demanding rent, and
the furniture was being repossessed.
At times, the husband was close by
living with relatives and at other
times he had traveled far away. Often
the wife would have some sense of
where the husband was staying and
where he worked. The PAWC would
take the case, search for the husband,

threaten him with a lawsuit for failure to support, and collect support
payments for the wife. If the husband did not agree to pay, the PAWC
often would convince his employer
to pay wages directly to the PAWC
for the benefit of the wife. Actions
such as these combined the threat
of litigation with public humiliation
by making visible a man’s failure as
a breadwinner. In the small number of cases where these methods
failed, the PAWC might file a lawsuit
against the husband for nonsupport.
Meanwhile the PAWC also would
negotiate with the landlord and furniture dealer for lower or postponed
payments. The PAWC rarely initiated lawsuits and this was for good
reason. A lawsuit would require that
the PAWC’s male lawyer become
involved. Even more important, the
PAWC had little faith in the courts
and did not believe that courts could
actually deliver justice.

T

he PAWC’s vision of legal aid
went well beyond representing
plaintiffs in claims for monetary
damages. Rather the PAWC devised for itself the mission of overseeing the court system’s treatment
of poor and working-class women’s
cases involving sexual assault. The
PAWC declared that they intended
to protect such women from a legal
system that too often failed to take
seriously cases in which women
made claims of rape or sexual abuse.
Rather, courts and the state dis-
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missed charges, charged defendants
with minor offenses, or even found
defendants innocent in cases where
significant proof of abuse existed.
The PAWC argued that defendants’
lawyers endlessly delayed cases and
inappropriately influenced judges. If
a trial occurred, the defendant’s lawyer humiliated the victim by attacking her character and chastity. Likewise the state’s attorney, who was
at best overworked and apathetic,
could not be relied upon to prosecute cases fully.
Leaders of the Agency also believed that the court system was
filled with justices of the peace and
police magistrates who had obtained
their appointment through political
connections and were often corrupt.
By contrast with corrupt non-elite
justices of the peace, police magistrates, and lawyers, PAWC members
considered themselves more competent and certainly more virtuous. In
1887, the PAWC confidently wrote
a letter to state appellate judges regarding the deplorable state of the
lower courts. The letter declared,
“We have had cases in which we
believe political influences have
governed the Justices. We have had
cases in which sympathy with vice
seemingly decided the question. We
have had cases in which the attorney for the accused controlled the
Justice, and it was deemed impossible to secure a fair hearing.” They
further complained of intentional
delays, mind-numbing technicali-
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ties, discourteous treatment by court
personnel, crowded courtrooms,
and magistrates’ and court officers’
lack of sympathy with or concern
for poor women. The letter urged
the appellate justices to appoint only
the most qualified attorneys to judicial positions. Regarding the issue
of qualifications, the PAWC’s complaints were laden with contradictions. Even its most powerful and
active members did not have formal
legal training, and the PAWC’s mission was to exert their own influence
over judges.
Part of what the PAWC found so
objectionable was that police magistrates and other lower court judges
were not only deeply ensconced in
politics but were also non-elite, often immigrant men. The PAWC’s
attack on court officials reflected
their larger fear of the power that
immigrants and non-elite men,
through political connections and
the system of Chicago’s ward bosses,
had obtained. By contrast with the
supposedly illegitimate power exercised by court officials, the members
of the PAWC saw themselves and
the power that they exercised to be
earned, natural, and above reproach.
When the PAWC learned about
a case of sexual violence, it became
involved in multiple ways, including
conducting its own investigation,
gathering evidence, and speaking
with judges and attorneys. At times,
PAWC members would pressure
the state’s attorney into allowing
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the PAWC’s own attorney to prosecute cases. In their own words, they
would act “the sister’s part.” One of
the PAWC’s best-publicized and
most visible tactics was to appear
en masse in courtroom proceedings
involving cases of sexual assault. In
doing so, they functioned as judicial
watchdogs whose presence was intended to shame court officials and
lawyers into proper behavior. PAWC
members walked a fine line in assuming this role, as truly respectable
women rarely appeared in court,
which all recognized as a masculine
space. Chicago’s police courts were
rough-and-tumble places—crowded,
noisy, filled with smoke, and teeming with defendants of all sorts.
These were hardly places where ladies appeared. Responding to the
PAWC’s actions, some court officials
declared that the courts, especially
police courts, were not an appropriate place for respectable women.
Such judicial opprobrium only increased the PAWC’s tenacity and
paradoxically augmented the impact
had by the public nature of their protests. As the PAWC explained, “The
presence of a delegation of reputable
women, women of social position
and influence, changes the moral
tone of Police court, and imparts
courage to a timid girl, whose very
innocence confuses her, in the presence of so many strange men.”
As PAWC members invaded the
courtroom, they also began to question substantive and evidentiary laws

regarding sex crimes. Particularly
infuriating was how defense lawyers raised issues of a victim’s consent and used past sexual conduct
to demonstrate consent, even when
crimes involved girls. The PAWC
strongly condemned as hypocritical
the double standard that permitted
men to have sex outside marriage
while condemning women who did
so. Connecting this understanding
to the legal arena, they sought to
make a woman’s chastity and morality irrelevant to the question whether
she was the victim of a sex crime. As
members continued to attend court,
they began to assert that the courts’
unfair treatment of women in cases
regarding sexual violence was not
caused only by individual men’s behavior. Rather, the PAWC insisted,
this unfair treatment was engrained
into law and required the enactment
of new laws that would exclude evidence of a women’s chastity or previous conduct. It explained, “[I]mmorality should be no hindrance to
legal rights in one sex more than the
other.” It also campaigned to raise
the legal age of consent, which in
Illinois was ten for a girl. Laws raising the age of consent went handin-hand with reforming evidentiary
rules and burden of proof standards,
as statutory rape made questions of
consent and a girl’s character and past
sexual conduct moot. As the PAWC
understood, such reformed laws removed a judge’s discretion and further
controlled defense attorneys’ behavior.
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Significantly, the PAWC did not
conceptualize its legal work as distinct from its other work, which included providing nonlegal advice,
giving financial aid, locating lodgings, finding employment, and seeking medical services for its clients. It
would have made little sense to the
women of the PAWC to believe that
the purpose of legal aid was simply
to provide their clients the ability to
go to court separated from a concern
with substantive justice or material
well-being. Moreover, they claimed,
the PAWC provided its clients with
“self-respect” and “self-dependence.”
The women of the PAWC also
tended to accept the stories told by
those women seeking their help. In
other words, they presumptively believed their clients rather than finding their stories suspect. Moreover,
they appreciated the importance of
allowing clients to tell their stories
slowly, which they asserted “busy
lawyers would not bear.” As they recognized, many women who sought
help did not have legally cognizable
claims. But they believed that client
narratives had value in and of themselves. “Many a tale of woe is told
in our office, the mere listening to
which by sympathetic and intelligent women is all the help possible.
It is astonishing how grateful some
of these women are for the opportunity of telling their trials to such lisPhoto of Lucy Louisa Flower, longtime officer
of the PAWC, Chicago Markers of Distinction,
http://chicagotribute.org/Markers/Flower.htm.
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teners.” For a poor woman to tell her
story to a middle-class or wealthy
woman and to have her listen to and
acknowledge her story must have
given the poor women a sense of
empowerment and agency.
Like attorneys, volunteers and
employees of the PAWC treated all
conversations with clients as confidential, often refusing to write or
speak about individual cases. As
Holt wrote, “Much of our work is of
a confidential nature, and as our aim
has always been to encourage women
to come to us for advice and counsel, it has been one of the essential
stimulants to them to be assured of
the strictly private nature of all work
that could be kept private.” Thus the
Agency never publicly discussed its
cases in any detail, even in its fund-
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raising materials. By contrast with
a variety of reform organizations,
especially those related to women,
the PAWC eschewed melodramatic
narratives of seduction and betrayal
of young women. In their view, such
stories and issues were so serious
that they needed to stand outside
popular discourse. They were not to
be traded upon and instead were to
be treated as precious.

E

arly in its history, the PAWC’s
members correctly understood
their power as coming from their
class and social position. As time
passed, they began to base their
claims to expertise and authority
on their growing legal knowledge
and experience. They proudly proclaimed that the bench and the bar
recognized and appreciated their
expertise. The PAWCs relationship
to judges and attorneys was complicated, because they simultaneously
looked down on many lawyers and
judges while still longing for their
acceptance and basking in their
compliments. When longtime officer and board member Mary Potter
Crane died, the PAWC boasted that
“she had a judicial mind, and was
always welcome at the State’s Attorney’s office, and her advice and
counsel in difficult cases . . . were
frequently sought by attorneys.”
Likewise, one board member wrote
that Charlotte Holt “has so won the
respect and confidence of the courts
that whatever case she presents

is sure of respectful hearing.” The
PAWC was also particularly proud
when, in the late 1890s, they received requests from judges to have
the PAWC station a representative
in every police court to handle cases
involving women, an affirmation
of the PAWC’s importance and its
members’ legal and practical expertise.
The work of the PAWC had lasting influence not only in shaping
the idea and practice of providing
organized legal aid to the poor, but
also in building Chicago’s specialized courts, including its juvenile
and domestic relations courts. A
number of women who were officers of the PAWC played significant
roles in the creation of these courts
and the PAWC may have functioned
as a model for such courts. Both of
these courts were intended to move
away from an adversary model of
law and sought to minimize the
role of lawyers. Likewise, tremendous discretion was vested in social
workers, often women, whose job
was to understand holistically those
who appeared before the court. They
were to use such knowledge to fashion individual solutions, and such
courts were intended to be flexible
institutions not bound by strict understandings of the rule of law.
The PAWC was an extraordinary
institution. At a time when only a
miniscule number of women were
lawyers, it created a space in which
women provided legal advice to
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other women. Situated within a
thick network of women’s clubs, the
PAWC expanded its activities to provide a wide range of legal services to
women, and it refused to make hard
distinctions either between the types
of cases that it would handle or between legal versus nonlegal cases. In
1905, the PAWC became the Chicago Legal Aid Society and its vision
of legal aid as part of a continuum of
care became the hallmark of a Chicago-style of legal aid, which is still
with us today. ◆
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“Telegraph operator printing telegram,” photo by Waldon Fawcett, c. 1908, National Photo Company Collection,
Library of Congress.

WHAT’S A TELEGRAM?
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.

W

hen Chicago-Kent’s predecessors were founded
in 1888, there were no
e-commerce, wireless access to media,
e-mail, Facebook friends, or airline
delays. That does not mean, however,
that people did not shop remotely, enjoy entertainment, communicate with
friends, or travel. They just did them
in other ways, all of which sometimes
spawned disputes, some of which
found their way into the courts. What
follows is a story of the dreams of 125
years ago. The characters are fictional.
What they talk about is not.
✳

✳

✳

Annie Morton, 22, had just finished
playing “Now Where Did You Get
That Hat?” on the piano in the parlor
of the rooming house at 2210 South
Prairie Street in Chicago.
“I should like to have one just the
same as that!
“Where’er I go, they shout ‘Hello!
Where did you get that hat?’” she
sang.
Patrick Boland, still dressed in his
telegraph messenger’s blue uniform
with red trim, sat on the couch by
the piano and applauded. His cap
with a prominent brass number “79”
sat on the table beside him.
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Annie giggled and then looked at
Luther Wardell, who was sitting in a
plush chair beside the couch. “What’s
the matter, Luther?” she asked. “You
don’t like it? It’s one of the most popular songs this year.”
“Oh, I’m sorry!” Luther said. He
plucked at his blue denim trousers.
“I enjoyed it. I was just thinking
while I listened.”
“About the strike?” Patrick asked.
“Yeah. I think I’m just going to go
home and help work the farm. I
didn’t think they’d fire all of us. Who
knew that they’d be able to get hundreds of strike breakers to work as
switchmen and brakemen within a
week.”
“That’s the CB&Q Railroad for you,”
Patrick said. “They’re even nastier to
their passengers than to the brakemen. They’re tough.”
“Everyone is tough,” Luther responded. “I’m sick of it. You come to
Chicago to make your fortune, and
everyone holds you down. There are
no decent jobs.”
“Sure there are,” Patrick said. “I’ve
got one, with American District
Telegraph Company. When I started,
at age twelve, the pay was $17 per
month. Now, I’m one of about one
hundred boys employed, most in the
LaSalle Street central office, but I’m
up to $20.”
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“Oh, we know, we know,” Luther
said. “Seven long years you’ve been
telling us your boring stories about
it.”
“It’s not boring at all. It’s exciting,”
Patrick said, glancing at his cap
proudly and determined to gain the
upper hand against Luther. “We’re allowed to take on special errands for
our customers. One guy who owns
the livery stable up by the river paid
me two dollars to follow his wife and
report to him that she had spent a
good part of her day with one of the
stable boys.” He was disappointed by
Annie’s lack of reaction.
“I’ve heard that Western Union pays
better,” Annie said. “They have about
140 boys, about half of them working
out of the main office at LaSalle and
Washington Streets.” Annie liked to
tease Patrick almost as much as she
liked playing music.
“It’s not so bad,” Patrick said. He liked
for Annie to think well of him. “We
wait on benches at the office and get
called in turn, according to when we
went out last. Almost everyone rides
a safety bicycle now. When a customer rings his call box, we ride out
and pick up a handwritten message
and bring it back for transmission.”
“What’s a safety bicycle?” Luther
asked.
“You are a farm boy,” Patrick laughed.
“You ought to get one. They’ve been
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out for three years. They’re much
better than the old kind with a large
front wheel and a smaller rear one.
These new ones have pneumatic
tires.”
“I can’t afford one now,” Luther said
glumly.
“I don’t like it that we have to pay for
our own uniforms,” Patrick admitted. “They cost $12, and they take it
out of our pay.”
“I bet you have to buy your own bicycle, too,” Luther said. “That’s not
for me. I’ve got loans to pay back
now.”
“You had to borrow money only because you lived so high during the
strike. You should have saved up beforehand,” Annie said.
She shifted her attention back to
Patrick. “You’re a thing of the past,”
Annie said. “What do people need
with telegraph boys when they can
just use the telephone?”
“Don’t be ridiculous,” Patrick said.
“Telephones will never replace the
telegraph. Everyone knows that. Did
you see the article in the January 1,
1888, Chicago Daily Tribune?”
“No.”
“It was headlined, ‘Telephones a Nuisance.’ It quoted the Reedy Elevator
“Frank, the Telegraph Boy,” illustration (uncredited)
from The Telegraph Boy by Horatio Alger, Jr., 1879.

Manufacturing Company as saying,
‘The service we receive is not at all
satisfactory, and if all instruments
could be removed we would have
ours fired at once. Would much prefer the old system of messengers, letters, or dispatches, as frequent costly
errors are made by telephone, which
you cannot trace to any reliable party.
We don’t think the telephone company has sufficient assistance in their
offices to wait on calls promptly. Frequently we ring three or four times
before we hear the lazy “hello?” and
more frequently they reply, “Busy
now—call again,” or “Busy; will ring
you up when through.” But they
never ring. We consider it very poor
service. But as our neighbors and
customers have the phone we must
keep up with the procession.’”
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“That’s not fair,” Annie said. “I work
very hard. So does everyone else.”
“We’re all getting screwed,” Luther
said. “And now, that robber baron,
Benjamin Harrison, stole the election from Grover Cleveland.”
“He’s not a robber baron,” Annie said.
“I wouldn’t think you would favor
Cleveland. He vetoed pensions for
veterans. He’s not for the common
man. And he’s a sympathizer for the
South. He would have never supported the women’s suffrage movement. We’re poised to get something
done, now, on the amendment. The
two main organizations merged last
year.”
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them and said that the precedent
was well established that women
could be admitted to the bar. I’m going to apply.”
“Even if they let you in,” Patrick said,
“and even if you get admitted to the
bar, no one will give a girl lawyer any
work.”
“I hope you won’t borrow any
money for that,” Luther said, laughing. “You’d be better off borrowing it
to go to saloons.”

“It would help you save money for
a bicycle, if they were shut down,”
Annie said. “Anyway, I’m going to
do my part. I’m going to become a
lawyer.”

“I’ve already got a promise of some
work,” Annie said. “One of the mechanics at the telephone company
wants me to help him get a patent
for his idea for a new switchboard
apparatus. It’s a good idea. The days
of making a telephone call by signaling a switchboard operator and
giving her the name of the person
to be called are over. They have just
introduced five-digit numbers to
accommodate the rapid growth in
subscribers. Now automatic dialing
is being introduced in Chicago—”

“A lawyer!” Patrick said. “You can’t
be a lawyer.”

“Because of the rude and lazy operators,” Luther said.

“Yes, I can. Did you see the story in
the September 7, 1888, edition of the
Chicago Daily Tribune? Miss Emma
Baumann and Miss Ada Dalter applied for admission to the Chicago
Evening Law School. Several of the
seventy young men already enrolled
objected and went to Judge Moran,
one of the founders, who rebuked

“What does this guy look like?”
Patrick asked.

“Women’s suffrage—pshaw!” Luther
said. “Next thing they’ll want is to
shut down the saloons.”

“Jealous?” Annie teased.
“Well, you ought to think about it,”
Patrick said. “You’re on the verge of
becoming an old maid.”

30

Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress

“And all the inventiveness is already
producing lots of lawsuits—more
work for lawyers,” Annie argued.
“Alexander Graham Bell and Western Union are suing each other.
Morse’s patent for the telegraph is
always being challenged.”
“Keep your job, but organize,” Luther said. “Launch a strike against all
this mechanical foolishness, taking
away jobs. It was bad enough on the
railroad.”
“Oh, right,” Annie said. “It’s a wonder you still have all your fingers.
They need to make the Janney automatic coupler mandatory.”
“I guess I don’t have to worry about
that anymore,” Luther said, flexing
the fingers on both hands and looking at them. “That’s another thing a
union could do for us. The most basic goal, though, is to insist on what
the Congress just did for mail carriers: making eight hours a full day of
work, with overtime pay for hours
worked over eight.”
“That’ll never happen,” Patrick declared. “And they shouldn’t have
done it for the post office workers.
They don’t work as hard as we do,
and we damn sure don’t have a deal
like that.”
“They deliver mail twice a day to residential customers and four times a
day to businesses,” Luther said.

“It would be quicker if they rode bicycles, like we do,” Patrick said.
“Just wait,” Annie said. “Bicycles
aren’t the future. Self-propelled carriages are. The Wisconsin legislature
just awarded a prize for a steam-propelled carriage that completed a
race from Green Bay to Madison, a
distance of 201 miles at an average
speed of six miles per hour.”
“That was nine years ago,” Luther
said. “And nothing has come of it.
There’ll be flying machines before
horses and railroads need to be
afraid.”
“Better try to get a union for the
horses,” Annie said. “There will be
flying machines. Four years ago, a
man named John Joseph Montgomery made a glider flight near San
Diego.”
“Yeah, but you can’t put a steam
engine in a glider,” Patrick said. He
laughed. “If they could, Luther, you
can make sure they hook them together with automatic couplers. A
flying train!”
“I’m telling you,” Annie said. “People are inventing things all over the
place. Pretty soon, I won’t have to
learn the new songs to play them on
the piano. Thomas Edison just got a
patent for a machine that plays music from grooves etched on a wax
cylinder.”

Henry H. Perritt, Jr.
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Photo of telephone operators sitting at a switchboard, 1903, DN-0001438, Chicago Daily News
negatives collection, Chicago History Museum.

“Well, I guess they can stop work
on the Auditorium Theatre,” Patrick
said, “even though it’s scheduled to
open next year. President Harrison
and Vice President Levi Morton
are supposed to come to the grand
opening. They’ll be disappointed to
hear that all the operas and plays
are going to have to find somewhere
else to perform in Chicago. Oh—I
forgot—there won’t be any operas
and plays. They’ll be a thing of the
past. Everyone will stay at home,
sit on the couch and listen to ‘phonographs.’ They’ll all get fat, and no
one will learn how to play the piano
anymore.”
Annie ignored him. “And he just
applied for another one: an ‘Optical Phonograph,’ capable of showing pictures in full motion. Already,
people are excited about the Kodak,

the first roll-film camera just patented. And a man named Herman
Hollerith received a patent for an
automatic tabulating machine. You
punch numbers into paper cards and
his machine sorts them.”
“You must have gotten into your
mother’s laudanum,” Patrick said.
“Next thing you’ll predict is sending telegraph signals through the air,
without wires.”
“It’s possible,” Annie said. “An English scientist, James Clark Maxwell,
has already proven mathematically
that electricity can be transferred
through free space, and a German,
Heinrich Hertz, has demonstrated it
in his laboratory.”
“Things are changing pretty fast,”
Luther said, showing a spark of enthusiasm for the first time. “There
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sure is a lot of stuff being invented
on the railroads,” Luther said. “The
Janney automatic coupler is one;
airbrakes before that. Now, people
are working on automatic signaling
systems and even on ways to replace
the steam locomotive with some
kind of engine that burns fuel inside
the cylinders. I’ve been coming up
with some ideas of my own before I
got caught up in the strike.” A hint
of sadness returned to his face. “One
thing I’ll miss is all the machinery.”
He thought for a moment and then
rushed on: “Think about what Old
Man Sears and his partner, Roebuck, have already done. Their new
‘Sears & Roebuck’ catalog was just
published from their new office on
Homan Street. It advertises watches
and jewelry, which can be purchased
by mail. ‘Book of Bargains: A Money
Saver for Everyone,’ ‘Cheapest Supply House on Earth,’ and ‘Our trade
reaches around the World,’ he brags.
People are ordering them like crazy.
There’s no reason they can’t include
other stuff, like sewing machines,
sporting goods, musical instruments, saddles, firearms, buggies,
bicycles, baby carriages, eyeglasses,
clothing . . . ” He looked at Patrick.
“Or safety bicycles,” he said.
“She must have given you some of
the laudanum,” Patrick said. “Steam
powered gliders linked with automatic couplers, card sorting machines linked with vapor telegraph
signals. Just imagine!” Patrick chuck-

led. “For that matter, you could order
from the catalog with a vapor telegram. Old Man Sears would track
the orders by sorting the cards, and
deliver the stuff by steam-powered
gliders and steam carriages.”
“I tell you what, Luther,” Annie said.
“Don’t go back to the farm. Stay here,
with us. I’ll become a lawyer and
help you get patents on all the stuff
you’ll invent—if you keep all your
fingers. Go talk to Reverend Frank
Wakeley Gunsaulus, the minister at
Plymouth Congregational Church.
He’s already trying to persuade Philip Armour to extend his grant for
the Sunday School that Julia Beveridge is running to establish a new
kind of school where students of all
backgrounds can prepare for meaningful roles in a changing industrial
society, to study mechanics, chemistry, architecture, and library science.
They already have something like
that in Boston. It’s named the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—
‘Boston Tech,’ most people call it.”
Luther looked at her.
“We’d make a good team,” she urged,
with a quick glance at Patrick.
“Who knows?” Luther added.
“Maybe we’ll get married.” He leered
at Patrick.
“Maybe,” Annie said, “Even though
Patrick is cuter in that uniform. Put
on the hat, handsome.”

Henry H. Perritt, Jr.

“Ha!” Luther said. “I can just see it.
He’ll still be riding his safety bicycle
around the streets of Chicago asking
people if they want to send a telegram,
and they’ll say, ‘What’s a telegram?’”
Annie laughed. Patrick tried to
smile, the hat halfway to his head.
“And then,” Luther said, looking at the
hat and laughing harder. “They’ll say,
‘now where did you get that hat?’” ◆
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Advertisement for the Kodak camera, c. 1890.

PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY:
A 125-YEAR REVIEW
Lori Andrews

T

he year the Chicago-Kent
College of Law was founded,
a new consumer product
arrived on the scene: the portable
camera. Before then, taking someone’s photo was a big deal. A person
would get dressed up and go to a studio. Photos were not taken without
a person’s permission. But the portable camera changed all that—and in
the process led to the development
of legal rights of privacy that endure
today.
An 1890 newspaper article
warned:
Have you seen the Kodak fiend?
Well, he has seen you. He caught

your expression yesterday while
you were innocently talking at the
Post Office. He has taken you at a
disadvantage and transfixed your
uncouth position and passed it on
to be laughed at by friend and foe
alike. His click is heard on every
hand. He is merciless and omnipresent and has as little conscience
and respect for proprieties as the
verist hoodlum. What with Kodak
fiends and phonographs and electric search lights, modern inventive genius is certainly doing its
level best to lay us all out bare to
the gaze of our fellow-men.

Like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,

Lori Andrews

Snapchat and YouTube today, the
portable camera fundamentally
changed the way other people and
institutions could peer into people’s
lives. But the issues raised by today’s
cutting-edge technologies are similar
to those raised by the Kodak fiend.
In the late 1800s, a lawyer, Samuel
Warren, married the daughter of a
Senator. He was unprepared for the
incessant media attention to their
union, fueled by the newly developed portable camera. After his children were born, paparazzi would
snap photos of the babies when the
family took walks down the street.
Annoyed, he thought about what
legal recourse he might have. Were
there any legal precedents for a
“right to be let alone”? He pondered
the issue with a friend from law
school, Louis Brandeis. They could
have suggested that people no longer had a right to be left alone because technologies could now track
and record what they did. Instead
they noted that the intrusiveness of
technologies like the portable camera made it even more important
for people to have control over information about themselves. “The
intensity and complexity of life attendant upon advancing civilization
has rendered necessary some retreat
from the world,” they wrote, “so that
solitude and privacy have become
more essential to the individual; but
modern enterprise and invention
have, through invasion upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain
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and distress, far greater than could
be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”
Their article, “The Right to Privacy,” was published in 1890 in the
Harvard Law Review. They demonstrated that a privacy right had a
basis in fundamental constitutional
values, such as the right to refuse to
testify against oneself, and common
law principles, such as the “right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to
others.”
“The protection afforded to
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
. . . is merely an instance of the enforcement of the most general right
of the individual to be let alone,”
they said. “It is like the right not to
be assaulted or beaten, the right not
to be imprisoned, the right not to be
maliciously prosecuted, the right not
to be defamed.”
Their ideas were incorporated
into law through the creation of
four distinct legal actions for invasion of privacy: for intruding on
someone’s seclusion, for publicly
disclosing private information, for
putting a person in a “false light” in
the public eye, and for appropriating
someone’s name or likeness for commercial use. They advocated that
information about and photos of
people could be disseminated if they
had consented or if the matter was of
legitimate public interest. Since then,
the fundamental constitutional right
to privacy has additionally been in-
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terpreted to include a right to make
important personal decisions, such
as whether to use contraception or
whether to homeschool your child.
The mode of analysis of the two
Boston lawyers from a century ago
has been used to analyze each new
technology that has reached the
courts. How does it affect the indi-

ultimately, privacy prevailed.
When Charles Katz entered a
public phone booth in 1965, he never
imagined that cops would tap the
phone line. The cops charged him
with placing illegal bets—and he
protested that they had infringed the
Fourth Amendment limits on governmental intrusion into a person’s

vidual and society? How do fundamental legal values help to protect
the individual when the technology
is used? As each new technology has
been adopted—including forensic
technologies, medical technologies,
and computer technologies—the application of fundamental values has
been used to protect, and often expand, people’s privacy rights. Sometimes courts, lacking the comprehensive analysis of technology like
the one undertaken by Warren and
Brandeis, took missteps when they
first encountered a technology. But

private life. The trial judge said that
wiretapping didn’t violate the Fourth
Amendment because the Founding
Fathers drafted the constitutional
provision to honor people’s privacy
in their homes. In this case, the police hadn’t trespassed into his home.
In fact, there had even been a Supreme Court decision on the matter,
back in 1928, when cops had used
earlier wiretap technology to learn
that someone was violating Prohibition.
In that earlier case, Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
the five-justice majority of the U.S.
Supreme Court had held that a

“The Kodak Fiend,” Hawaiian Gazette, December 9, 1890,
Chronicling America Collection, Library of Congress.
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bootlegger’s privacy hadn’t been
invaded and he hadn’t been forced
to incriminate himself because, although police had recorded the calls
he was making from his home, the
wiretap equipment had been placed
on phone lines outside his home.
Writing for the dissent was none
other than Louis Brandeis, who was
then a Supreme Court justice. He
argued that fundamental values had
to be applied to new technologies.
He noted that when the Constitution was adopted, “force and violence”—torture and breaking into
people’s houses—were the only ways
that the government had to obtain
private information about people.
The Constitution protected against
force and violence. But, said Brandeis, “discovery and invention have
made it possible for the government,
by means far more effective than
stretching upon the rack, to obtain
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet. . . . The progress
of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is
not likely to stop with wiretapping.
Ways may some day be developed by
which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by
which it will be enabled to expose to
a jury the most intimate occurrences
of the home.” According to Brandeis,
the Constitution’s fundamental value of
privacy and the right not to incriminate
yourself needed to be applied not only
to “what has been, but of what may be.”

F
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orty years after the Olmstead
decision, when Charles Katz’s
case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the majority of the
justices applied Brandeis’s logic.
Even though Charles Katz was using a public phone booth, the Court
said that the constitutional right of
privacy “protects people, not places.”
What a person seeks to preserve as
private, even in a public place, may
be constitutionally protected.
The Supreme Court protected
Katz’s privacy by enunciating a legal
test that is still used today: Did the
person have an “expectation of privacy” and was that an expectation
that society was willing to protect?
As a result, police need to get a warrant, based on probable cause, before
they tap someone’s phone.
The march of law enforcement
technology continued, and in 2001,
a new forensic technology reached
the court. A federal agent suspected
Danny Kyllo of growing marijuana.
Since growing pot indoors requires
high-intensity lamps, the agent sat in
a car across from the home and used
an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan Kyllo’s home. The
scan showed that the roof over the
garage and a side wall of the home
were relatively hot compared to the
rest of the home and substantially
warmer than neighboring homes
in the triplex. The agent concluded
that Kyllo was growing pot and
convinced a judge to allow him to
search Kyllo’s home. The agent found
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pot, and Kyllo was convicted on a
drug charge. Because the thermal
scanner did not physically intrude
on the house and did not show any
private human activities, the trial
court said that it hadn’t infringed
Kyllo’s constitutional rights.
The appellate court, too, held that
Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had
made no attempt to conceal the heat
escaping from his home, and “even
if he had, there was no objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy
because the imager ‘did not expose
any intimate details of Kyllo’s life,’
only ‘amorphous “hot spots” on the
roof and exterior wall.’”
When the U.S. Supreme Court
took the case, it reversed Kyllo’s
conviction. “It would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy
secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology,” wrote Justice Antonin Scalia.
“Where, as here, the Government
uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the
home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court
in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012), assessed the use of a
GPS tracking device installed on a
car driven by Antoine Jones, a D.C.
nightclub owner. Jones was the tar-

get of a narcotics investigation by
police and the FBI. The Court held
9 to 0 that the twenty-eight-day warrantless use of the GPS violated the
Fourth Amendment. In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor pointed
out how the fundamental right to
privacy was salient even in today’s
world. “GPS monitoring generates
a precise, comprehensive record of
a person’s public movements that
reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,”
wrote Sotomayor, adding, “People
disclose the phone numbers they
dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the
e-mail addresses with which they
correspond to their Internet service
providers; and the books, groceries
and medication they purchase to
online retailers. . . . I for one doubt
that people would accept without
complaint the warrantless disclosure
to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the
last week, or month, or year.” Justice
Sotomayor also was concerned that
“[a]wareness that the government
may be watching chills associational
and expressive freedoms.”
Contemporary medical technologies, such as genetic testing, have
also raised disputes about the reach
of privacy principles. When genetic
testing became possible, people were
tested without their knowledge or
consent. Doctors and researchers
would use blood that people had
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given to labs for routine cholesterol
or pregnancy tests and perform additional testing, without the person’s
consent, for everything from breast
cancer to Alzheimer’s disease. The
argument was, what’s the harm? The
person had already been pricked; the
additional tests involved no additional intervention. And even if the
blood was collected anew—as in a
forensic DNA test—blood tests were
safe and noninvasive.
But then employers and insurers
started discriminating against healthy
people based on their genetic predisposition to future disease. With certain genetic mutations, for example, some women had a higher risk
of developing breast cancer than
other women. Even with those mutations, half the women would not
develop breast cancer. Some women
didn’t want to know whether they
had the mutations or not. They said
they would feel like they had a time
bomb ticking away inside them. But
employers and insurers wanted that
information to make their decisions.
There were no legal limits on what
could be done with that information.
During routine physicals, an
employer in California asked the
company doctor to surreptitiously
test the female employees to see if
they were pregnant and the African-American employees to see if
they carried the sickle cell anemia
gene mutation. The results were not
disclosed to the employees, but they
were put in to their personnel files.
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When the existence of the files
leaked, the employees sued. The trial
court dismissed the case, saying that
the test was a modest intrusion, no
more than what people usually undergo in a physical. But the appellate
court held that genes contain personal information that is protected
by the fundamental right to privacy.
“One can think of few subject areas
more personal and more likely to
implicate privacy interests than that
of one’s . . . genetic make-up,” wrote
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d
1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998). Since
then, Congress has passed a law, the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, specifically prohibiting
employers and insurers from discriminating against people based on
the results of genetic tests. People’s
privacy rights include the right not to
have genetic information generated
about them or used against them.
Even computer technologies that
collect data about people have been
subject to a fundamental rights analysis. When Judge Robert Bork was
nominated for the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1987, Michael Dolan, a
Washington, D.C., newspaper reporter, attempted to discredit him
by publishing his video store rental
records. In today’s world, Judge
Bork’s choices seem tame: British
movies, Bond movies, costume dramas. The reporter was disappointed
not to see legal movies such as 12
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Angry Men or To Kill a Mockingbird.
Instead, Judge Bork had rented “only
one truly court-related tape”: The
Star Chamber.
Bork was denied confirmation by
the Senate. But the publication of his
video rentals did get the attention of
Congress. “It is nobody’s business
what Oliver North or Robert Bork
or Griffin Bell or Pat Leahy watch
on television or read or think about
when they get home,” said Senator
Pat Leahy. “In an era of interactive television cables, the growth of
computer checking and check-out
counters, of security systems and
telephones, all lodged together in
computers, it would be relatively
easy at some point to give a profile
of a person and tell what they buy in
a store, what kind of food they like,
what sort of television programs
they watch, who are some of the
people they telephone. . . . I think
that is wrong. I think that really is
Big Brother, and I think it is something that we have to guard against.”
Senator Paul Simon agreed.
“There is no denying that the computer age has revolutionized our
world. Over the past twenty years we
have seen remarkable changes in the
way each one of us goes about our
lives. Our children learn through
computers. We bank by machine. We
watch movies in our living rooms.
These technological innovations are
exciting and as a nation we should
be proud of the accomplishments
we have made. Yet, as we continue

to move ahead, we must protect time
honored values that are so central to
this society, particularly our right to
privacy. The advent of the computer
means not only that we can be more
efficient than ever before, but that we
have the ability to be more intrusive
than ever before. Every day Americans are forced to provide businesses
and others personal information
without having any control over
where that information goes. . . .
These records are a window into our
loves, likes, and dislikes.”
The legislators applied the fundamental constitutional right to privacy and passed a law in 1988 forbidding disclosure of people’s video
rental records (or, in this day and
age, what they watch on Netflix).
The bill prohibits video stores from
disclosing “personally identifiable information”—information that links
the customer or patron to particular
materials or services. In the event of an
unauthorized disclosure, an individual
may bring a civil action for damages.

T

he concerns raised by the disclosure of Bork’s video records
are mild when compared to today’s
digital invasion of privacy. A billion people have joined Facebook,
a population only slightly smaller
than either of the two largest countries, India and China. Marketing
companies, political candidates, law
enforcement agencies, employers, and
other social institutions peer through
the keyholes of people’s lives by as-
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sessing the information and photos
that individuals post and that third
parties post about them. Even more
troubling, data aggregators use surreptitious tracking mechanisms to
follow people across the web and use
that information to make judgments
about them. If a woman does a Google
search for old guitars and then seeks
a credit card, she will be offered a
credit card with less advantageous
terms—not because her credit is
bad, but because garage rock bands
in general are less likely to pay off
their credit cards. If she has a photo
of herself with a wineglass in her
hand, she may be denied a job. Seventy-five percent of employers look
at people’s social network presence;
one-third reject people who have alcohol in a Facebook photo. And, as
with past technologies, courts and
legislatures have been slow to protect privacy, initially holding that
privacy rights are lost “on affirmative

keystroke.”
In just the past two years, however, courts and lawmakers have
begun to protect freedom of expression and privacy on social networks.
In Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 650 F.3d 205 (3d. Cir. 2011),
and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d. Cir. 2011), the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held
that public high school students had
a First Amendment right that covered their posts on social networks
even if those posts were critical of
school administrators. And a few
state legislatures—including that of
Illinois—passed laws prohibiting
employers from asking for the social
network passwords of an employee
or a job applicant. That Illinois
law went into effect 125 years after
Chicago-Kent College of Law opened
its doors. The Illinois governor came
to the campus to sign the bill into law
and was introduced by a Chicago-
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Kent student who was working on
internet privacy issues.
The Warren and Brandeis article
not only created a legal framework
that still applies today to safeguard
people’s privacy, it also established
a method for judging new technologies. The authors analyzed how
fundamental values inherent in the
U.S. Constitution and common law
provide a basis to make judgments
about new technologies. They also
assessed how new technologies affected individuals, institutions, and
the larger society. Warren and Brandeis did not suggest that individuals
adapt to each new technology, but
instead advocated that society assure
that each technology was employed
in a way that was consistent with
fundamental societal values.
When Brandeis was appointed
to the U.S. Supreme Court 26 years
after his privacy article appeared,
he continued to champion the application of constitutional values to
modern technologies. He also wrote
about the nature of a Constitution.
“Time works changes, brings into
existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be
vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is peculiarly true of
Constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet
passing occasions. They are, to use
the words of Chief Justice Marshall,
‘designed to approach immortality
as nearly as human institutions can

approach it.’ The future is their care,
and provision for events of good and
bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the application
of a Constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what
has been but of what may be.”
When the law school opened its
doors 125 years ago, it would have
been difficult to imagine the hightech world of today. But by learning
about cutting-edge technologies as
well as fundamental legal principles,
the students at IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law have been well educated, in every era, to face their generation’s legal challenges. ◆
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Photo of John Montgomery Ward, 1922, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.

JOHN MONTGOMERY WARD:
THE LAWYER WHO TOOK ON BASEBALL
Christopher W. Schmidt

A

s 1888 drew to a close, John
Montgomery Ward stood
atop the world of professional baseball. The star shortstop
had just led the New York Giants
to the National League pennant, followed by a triumph over the St. Louis
Browns of the rival American Association in what even then went by
the inflated title of baseball’s “World
Series.” A dominating pitcher early
in his career (he threw the second
perfect game in major league history), an arm injury forced Ward
to recreate himself as an infielder,
where he became one of the best
fielders and hitters of his era. He was
lauded in the press as a ballplayer

with “few equals and no superiors,”
and “by long odds the most popular player in the profession.” These
accomplishments would eventually
earn Ward a place in the Baseball
Hall of Fame.
Ward’s skills on the ball field were
only a part of what made him such a
remarkable figure. Contemporaries
and historians alike have struggled to
describe him. One adjective-happy
biographer took the saturation approach: he was a “jug-eared, willowy,
peach-fuzzed, overreaching punk”
as well as “honorable, smart, and tenacious.” More admired than liked
seems to have been the consensus
view of Ward contemporaries. In a
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profession not known for intellectualism, he stood out. Although Ward
left school at the age of thirteen in
order to pursue his baseball career,
he eventually earned, in his spare
time, degrees in political science and
law from Columbia. He was said to
speak five languages. A regular contributor to newspapers and periodicals, in 1888 he published Baseball:
How to Become a Player, which he
described as a “handbook of the
game, a picture of the play as seen by
a player.”
Ward was also a pioneering labor
leader. In 1885, he established America’s first sports union, the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball
Players. Initially designed to help
sick, injured, or hard-up ballplayers
and promote professional standards,
the Brotherhood quickly evolved
into something approaching a craft
union for ballplayers. Ward had forward-looking attitudes on race as
well. At a time when the color line
was hardening in American society,
and organized baseball had become
a whites-only affair, Ward urged the
Giants to sign an African-American
pitcher.
If all this wasn’t enough, Ward’s
social life was also noteworthy. In
1887 he married a New York actress
and socialite, Helen Dauvray, who
also happened to be a passionate
baseball fan. “Her tiny hands beat
each other rapturously at every victory of the Giants and her dark eyes
were bedewed at every defeat,” re-
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ported the New York Times. “But
the thousands of spectators who observed Miss Dauvray’s emotions little suspected that one of the Giants
had any precedence over the others
so far as her affections were concerned.” She had donated the Tiffany
trophy that went to the World Series
champion; it was the “Dauvray Cup”
that her husband brought home at
the end of the 1888 season. In How
to Become a Player, the ever gallant
Ward included a chapter explaining
the basics of the game “for the benefit of those ladies whose escorts either cannot, or will not, answer their
questions.” He also offered advice for
his gentleman readers: “Whoever
has not experienced the pleasure of
taking a young lady to her first game
of ball should seize the first opportunity to do so.”
Life was not all three-hit games and
celebrity life for the great Monte Ward,
however. His relationship with
Helen Dauvray was strained almost
from the start. He was carrying on
an affair, and she knew it; she wanted
to return to the stage, and he didn’t
want her to. They lived together for
only a year and soon divorced.
His baseball career too was about
to veer off in some unexpected directions. Following his World Series triumph, Ward captained a team of National League all-stars that traveled
around the globe between October
1888 and April 1889 in an effort to
promote the game overseas. It was a
grand gesture, fitting for an emerg-
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ing era of American nationalism
and confidence on the international
scene. But the world tour also helped
set in motion one of the most significant upheavals in baseball’s history.
The man who organized and led the
tour around the globe was Albert
Goodwill Spalding. Soon after they
returned home, he and Ward would
face off in an epic struggle for the future of the game.
Spalding, a star pitcher in his
younger years, now owned the Chicago White Stockings of the NaJohn M. Ward, New York Giants baseball card portrait, 1887, Library of Congress. Facing: Photo of
Albert Goodwill Spalding, 1910, Bain Collection,
Library of Congress.

tional League in addition to a burgeoning sporting goods empire. The
game never had a more effective and
more passionate salesman. Baseball,
he once wrote, captured the nation
because “it is the exponent of American Courage, Confidence, Combativeness; American Dash, Discipline,
Determination; American Energy,
Eagerness, Enthusiasm; American
Pluck, Persistency, Performance;
American Spirit, Sagacity, Success;
American Vim, Vigor, Virility.”
(Spalding also basically created baseball’s all-American birth myth, which
conveniently featured a future Civil
War hero, Abner Doubleday, in 1839
dreaming up the game in bucolic
Cooperstown, New York. In fact,
baseball had largely evolved from
various children’s games; if it ever
had a proper birth moment, it was
among young professionals in 1840s
New York City.) Spalding envisioned
the world tour as an opportunity to
sell two things he loved above all:
the game of baseball and the equipment that bore his name. Despite his
background as a player, and despite
his overwrought romanticism about
the national pastime, Spalding approached his role as a team owner
from the perspective of the captain
of industry that he had become: the
players were employees, and comfortably paid ones at that; and it was
the owner’s job to control costs and
ensure a compliant workforce. Needless to say, he didn’t think much of
Ward’s efforts with the Brotherhood.
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T

he world tour had just reached
Cairo, Egypt, in February 1889
when the players received news that,
at their winter meetings in New
York, the National League owners
had adopted a major reform designed to reign in player salaries.
They created a player classification
system under which “Class A” players earned $2,500, “Class B” players
$2,250, and so on, down to “Class E”
players who earned $1,500. The classifications scheme took into account
not only player ability, but also “conduct, both on and off the field.”
Ward, who had already established himself as his generation’s
most outspoken critic of baseball’s
distinctive labor practices, saw the
plan as an affront to the players.
What made working as a professional ballplayer different from any
other occupation was the “reserve
clause,” a provision in player contracts under which an owner could
“reserve” a number of players when
the term of their contracts ended.
The clause prohibited the player
from negotiating with another team
unless his team released him. As
professional baseball was controlled
by an agreement between the teams
under which each team agreed to
respect the player contracts of other
teams, the reserved player faced
three options: sign a new contract
at the terms dictated by the owner;
hold out and hope for better terms;
or stop playing baseball. Owners
defended the reserve clause as es-

sential to ensuring the stability of
the game. It did indeed further this
goal. But there was another reason,
one they didn’t trumpet so proudly:
it kept down player salaries. And
here too it was effective. In the late
1880s, as club profits tripled, player
salaries grew by only 30 percent, a
fact at least partly attributable to the
reserve system.
In 1887, Ward had a scathing attack on the reserve clause, titled “Is
the Base-Ball Player a Chattel?” He
compared the reserve clause to “a
fugitive-slave law”: it “denies [the
player] a harbor or a livelihood,
and carries him back, bound and
shackled, to the club from which he
attempted to escape.” The remedy,
according to Ward, was simple: get
rid of “base-ball law” and allow “the
business of base-ball to be made to
rest on the ordinary business basis.”
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When he learned of the owners’
classification plan, Ward was so incensed he threatened to abandon the
world tour to come home and confront the owners. (The news that the
Giants were trying to trade him only
added to his frustration.) He suspected that Spalding had planned the
entire trip just to get him and some
of his allies out of the country in order to go forward with their plans.
If this was indeed Spalding’s plan
(and there is no evidence it was), it
backfired, as the tour ended up giving some of the game’s top players
long hours to share their grievances.
The plan for the baseball revolution
that would upend the game in 1890
might very well have been hatched
in quiet conversation among the
players while on Spalding’s world
tour. Nearly all the players on the
tour would join Ward’s revolt against
the National League.
During the 1889 season, Ward
began preparations for the creation
of a rival major league, the Players
League. Working in secret (he was,
after all, still on the enemy’s payroll), he found financial backing and
convinced many of his fellow players to commit to the new league.
Some aspects of the Players League
looked familiar. The players were familiar—the new league lured many
of the best National League players
to its rosters. And the cities in which
they played were familiar—the seven
cities in which their eight teams
played were all cities that already

had National League teams. But the
business model behind the Players
League was radically different from
anything that had come before.
Each club was run by an eight-man
board, consisting of four players and
four investors. The league was governed by a senate-like organization,
with two representatives from each
team (one elected by players, one by
owners). Players had three-year contracts, and no reserve clause. Investors were promised the first $10,000
of each club’s net profit, with the rest
to be divided among the players.
Spalding and the National League
attacked the Players League. First,
they turned to the courts: the Giants
sued Ward for breach of contract.
Ward had violated the terms of his
reserve clause, they claimed, and
they asked a New York state court
to issue an injunction prohibiting
Ward from playing for anyone else.
The court denied the injunction. As
the reserve clause failed to specify
such essentials as Ward’s salary and
the terms of the renewed contract,
the judge concluded that it was too
indefinite to be treated as a binding contract for the 1890 season.
The court also raised the disturbing
question of whether, assuming the
reserve clause were read to constitute a binding contract for the following season, the renewed contract
would also include a reserve clause.
If so, the player would be tied to his
current team for as long as the team
desired, while the team could release
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a player with only 10 days’ notice.
This was rather absurd, according
to the judge. “We have the spectacle
presented of a contract which binds
one party for a series of years and
the other party for 10 days, and of
the party who is itself bound for ten
days coming into a court of equity to
enforce its claims against the party
bound for years.” The judge concluded that the reserve clause was
unenforceable for “want of fairness
and of mutuality.”
With the courts refusing to help,
Spalding turned to public opinion.
He pulled out all the rhetorical stops.
What the players were doing was
“secession,” a “revolt,” a “war”; the
National League was confronting
“hot headed anarchists” who were
leading a “revolutionary movement.”
But the fall of the Players League
after just one season came not from
Spalding’s attacks in the press, nor
from legal challenges. It came from
the marketplace. The new league
had the best players, but this was not
enough. With three major leagues
competing for a limited fan base,
everyone suffered at the gate. At
season’s end, when Spalding opened
negotiations with Players League investors, he pointedly excluded Ward
and any other players. “[T]he monied men met with the monied men,”
as Spalding put it. The National League
owners simply bought out their
competition; several Players League
clubs were integrated into a reconfigured National League. Ward’s rev-
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olution was over.
Ward returned to the National
League, where he played four more
seasons. He was still one of the best
players in the league when he retired
in 1894. He went on to be a successful lawyer, a gentleman farmer, and
a top amateur golfer. Although he
mended fences with organized baseball, his passion for the cause he had
led never left him. In 1925, shortly
before his death, he gave a speech—
at an event to celebrate the National
League, of all places—recounting
the events of 1888–1890 in which he
made clear that the war against the
National League, while doomed, was
justified.

F

or a brief moment, the Players
League presented a radical alternative business model for professional sports, one in which the players and owners shared control of the
game as well as its profits. With the
failure of Ward’s baseball revolution,
the owner-dominated system lived
on. In the following decades, various
teams would go to court to have the
reserve clause enforced against players who had jumped their contracts
(a relatively common occurrence
any time there was a rival league that
refused to abide by the agreement
that controlled the baseball monopoly). Judges, with only the rarest of
exceptions, sided with the players,
often citing Ward’s case as authority on the matter. The reserve clause
lived on, however, and it did so be-
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cause the baseball monopoly, while
periodically challenged, remained in
place. As long as owners respected
the contracts of their on-the-field
competitors, they did not need the
courts. For this reason, the most
significant legal challenges to baseball’s unique labor practices came in
the realm of antitrust, not contract
law. But baseball law survived this
challenge too, as the United States
Supreme Court granted, and then
twice reaffirmed, that federal antitrust law did not apply to professional baseball.
When change eventually came in
the 1970s, it was at the hands of another organized players movement,
but this time it was achieved not
through a rival league but through
labor negotiations (with a critical assist from a sympathetic arbiter). Today, major league baseball operates
in a way that has some similarities
to the core premise of the alternative
model Ward had offered. The game
is governed, in large part, through
collective bargaining agreements between players and owners. With the
skyrocketing of player salaries after

the fall of the reserve clause, the game’s
profits are far more evenly distributed between players and owners.
It took almost a century, but John
Montgomery Ward’s vision for major league baseball has, in some part,
been realized. ◆
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“The fog,” Puck cartoon by Will Crawford, 1911, Library of Congress.

U.S. ANTITRUST: FROM SHOT IN THE
DARK TO GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
David J. Gerber

W

hen the United States
Congress enacted the
first “antitrust” law in
1890, it was taking a shot in the dark.
At the time, there was no concept of
“antitrust law”—i.e., a general legal regime intended to combat restraints on competition. Today more
than 100 countries have such laws,
including all significant participants
in the global economy. Competition
law has become a major factor in economic life throughout much of the
world. U.S. antitrust law has played
a central role in this remarkable evolution, and it is generally acknowledged to be the most important of

these laws. It is the touchstone and
frame of reference for international
discussions, and it is often used as
a model or at least a major source
of guidance by other countries in
developing their own competition
laws. The story is extraordinary, interwoven with the roles of power
and ideas and intertwined with the
evolution of the U.S. and its role in
the world. This brief essay sketches
its trajectory. Chicago-Kent’s role as
an educational institution tracks that
trajectory.
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I. A Shot in the Dark

T

his new type of legislation was
a “shot in the dark” in the sense
that few, if any, of the legislators had
any way of knowing what consequences the legislation would have.
They were “shooting” at something,
but they didn’t know what they
might actually hit. So what were they
trying to do and why?
Antitrust law was, above all, a
response to social turbulence and
tensions. The United States in the
1880s presented a complex mixture
of hope, fear and resentments. The
terrible Civil War was a memory,
but not a distant one. Rapid industrialization was creating great wealth
for a few and jobs for many. Immigration was bringing millions from
Europe to take those jobs and to find
land to farm in the Midwest and the
West. Yet the rapid changes also generated sectional conflicts and social
tensions, and political and legal institutions strained to respond effectively to them.
This mixture of pressures, conflicts and resentments led Congress
to enact what came to be known as
antitrust law. One key background
factor was the resentment that many
felt towards the new super rich and
their lavish and ostentatious lifestyles. Located primarily in New
York and other cities on the East
Coast, these groups had achieved
great wealth quickly, often through
control of large manufacturing busi-
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nesses. These firms often dominated
specific industries, and this dominance allowed them to exclude new
entrants from those industries. It
also allowed them to extract what
many viewed as unfair prices and
conditions on their suppliers as well
as their employees. This led to anger at the power of these so-called
“trusts” and often combined with
anger at the power of their owners
to control the destinies and stifle
the possibilities of others, especially
those in other parts of the country.
A specific catalyst for antitrust law
was rising anger among Midwestern
farming communities at what they
saw as rapacious and monopolistic conduct by railroad companies
and others who they believed were
manipulating prices paid to farmers for their grain and livestock.
Groups representing these interests
pressured their representatives in
Congress to do something about the
“trusts” that were amassing fortunes
for a few, but exploiting vast numbers of hardworking farmers and
tradesmen.
Congress responded to this
pressure by enacting the Sherman
Antitrust Act in 1890. The name
that soon attached to the legislation—“anti-trust”—reflected its goals.
It was a tool to be used to combat the
monopolistic abuses of very large
enterprises. There was, however, no
model for Congress to use in doing
what it wanted to do—or wanted
to appear to be doing. So Congress
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“punted”—it simply federalized two
barely used legal principles. It took
two concepts from the common law
that had been used for quite different
purposes, first in England and then
to a limited extent in the U.S., and it
made them enforceable under federal law. The statute was very short,
and its basics have not changed since
1890. The first concept was “restraint
of trade.” This concept had been
used primarily in civil cases to combat overly restrictive provisions in
contracts. The second basic idea was
“monopolization.” It had also been
part of the English common law, but
for centuries it had been little used
in either England or the U.S. The legislation contained virtually no guidance as to the substantive content of
the provisions, leaving issues of content to the federal courts.
The Sherman Act transformed
the role of these private law concepts
by providing that the federal government could enforce them. Congress
appears to have given little thought
to how this was to take place. It did
not create specific procedure for the
enforcement of the antitrust provisions. It merely authorized the U.S.
Justice Department to file claims in
the regular courts, using the normal
rules for civil proceedings. Given that
the federal government was still very
small in 1890, the legislators could
hardly have envisioned extensive
federal administrative application of
the provisions. Some assumed that
private actions could be brought on

the basis of the legislation, and this
was confirmed a few years later.
This was the “shot in the dark”!
The U.S. Congress was responding
to specific domestic pressures. The
legislators just took common law
concepts and gave the federal government authority to use them in
the federal courts. The legislators
paid little, if any, attention to how
others in the world had dealt with
similar issues or what, if anything,
they might think about the U.S. experiment. They just experimented,
basically relying on judges to sort
out the issues and develop the law.
II. An Antitrust System Develops

P

rior to the Second World War,
the system evolved slowly and
fitfully according to a pragmatic,
court-based process—typical of U.S.
legal development generally. The
judges were solving the conflicts before them, and there is little evidence
that they thought about their decisions as creating a “system” of antitrust law. They relied on accumulated practical experience, domestic
conceptions of the judicial role, and
often on ideologies about the role
of markets as they shaped the content and roles of antitrust in the U.S.
There were relatively few cases, and
other than in a few large companies
there was relatively little interest in
this area of the law.
After the war, the roles and importance of antitrust law expanded
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greatly. One factor was transnational. Antitrust came to be seen in
the U.S. as a part of a global “mission” to provide an antidote to fascism and to support freedom. Many
believed that the concentrations of
economic power in Germany and
Japan were at least in part responsible for the horrors of the Second
World War, and they saw antitrust
as a means of preventing such concentrations or at least curbing the
resulting abuses. This led U.S. government officials and others actively
to promote antitrust in Europe. A
European version of antitrust law
had begun to develop in the 1920s,
but it had not gained much status in
most European countries, and thus
U.S. antitrust became a symbol of restructuring in Europe, both in individual countries and in connection
with the process of European integration. At the same time, the economic and political dominance of
the U.S. in the so-called “free world”
allowed the U.S. to apply its antitrust
law to conduct outside its own territory and thus further support the
antitrust mission.
This heightened political, symbolic and economic importance of
antitrust on the international plane
combined with the de facto protection of the U.S. market encouraged
rapid growth in the perceived importance of antitrust within the U.S. and
the expansion of antitrust principles.
By the early 1970s, antitrust had become a very important part of the le-
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gal environment of business, and as
such it attracted strong interest from
lawyers. The growing importance of
antitrust meant that law schools increased their offerings in the area.
According to Ralph Brill, antitrust
was first taught at Chicago-Kent College of Law in 1973. This also meant,
however, that antitrust represented a
major cost for many U.S. businesses.
These costs were tolerated as long as
economic factors (especially currency
and regulatory obstacles) buffered U.S.
firms from international competition.
In the 1970s, the international
economic picture changed markedly,
and these changes in global economic
conditions generated a fundamental
change in U.S. antitrust law. The “oil
shocks” of the early 1970s and the
concomitant international currency
restructuring led to increased awareness in the U.S. business community
of the need for U.S. businesses to
compete internationally. Antitrust
now began to appear as a burden on
the U.S. economy, and this led scholars to examine ever more carefully
the intellectual justification for such
burdens. Economists and law professors increasingly argued that the
courts had expanded antitrust law
too far and that the entire edifice of
antitrust law should be viewed from
the perspective of its economic impact. This perspective quickly won
favor in the courts and law faculties,
and within a few years it led to a radical revision of standards for antitrust
law in the U.S. The central substantive
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law questions were now to be judged
by economists according to economic
criteria.
III. Global Competition Law Leadership

T

he “shot in the dark” that was
the U.S. antitrust law system is
today no longer solely a domestic
field of law. It is now also a critically important component of global
economic policy! The system that
U.S. judges had evolved to deal with
purely domestic problems and that
relied on little more than confidence
in the capacity of courts to develop
reasonable responses to conflicts
has been transformed into the central player in efforts to respond effectively to economic and other
forms of globalization. It is now a
U.S. export product, and the stakes
are enormous. What directions
and forms will the rules of competition take? Treatment of these
issues will be a factor in the future
of many countries, including the
U.S., and for more than two decades
Chicago-Kent has brought transnational competition law to our students, and Chicago-Kent faculty
have contributed to the international
discussion of these issues.
A. Foreign Interactions and Perceptions
U.S. antitrust now plays on a
global stage, and much will depend

on how foreign experts, lawyers,
government officials and business
leaders see U.S. antitrust. They will
make decisions about what to do in
their own countries and on the international level. This means that their
perspectives on the U.S. system are
critical to its roles both at home and
abroad, and foreign images of U.S.
antitrust have changed radically. Prior
to the Second World War, those in
Europe who knew anything about
U.S. antitrust law (and they were
few) generally considered it a mistake. They tended to see it as a failure that actually created more harm
than good by forcing companies to
merge rather than cooperate. This
view predominated in large measure
until after the Second World War.
The Europeans were developing a
different concept of competition law
that emphasized administrative control of dominant firms. This conception of competition was spreading
rapidly in Europe in the 1920s, but
depression and war led to its virtual
abandonment.
After that war ended, however,
U.S. antitrust law became associated
with U.S. economic dominance in
the “free world.” The real and imagined connections between economic
concentration and military expansion in both Germany and Japan
convinced many that U.S.-style antitrust law should be used to combat
such concentrations. U.S. occupation forces in Germany and Japan
imposed U.S. antitrust ideas during
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the occupation period, and the U.S.
insisted that both countries either
enact or maintain competition law
after the occupation. This increased
awareness of these ideas abroad.
Perhaps more important, however,
was the perception that antitrust
was a source of strength for the U.S.
economy and thus a potential spur
to growth that other countries could
employ.
U.S.-style antitrust did not, however, always fit well with European
legal traditions and institutions, and
in most European countries skepticism toward the U.S. model limited
progress in protecting competition.
In Germany, however, a separate set
of ideas about how to protect competition developed in the 1930s and
1940s in the underground, and after the war it became the basis for
German antitrust law. From here
it spread to the European level and
became part of the process of European integration. The basic idea of

U.S. antitrust law—i.e., protecting
the competitive process from restraints—was part of this model of
competition law, but the model itself
was conceptually and institutionally
quite distinct. European scholars and
officials in these areas often looked
to U.S. antitrust for comparisons and
insights into problems, but there was
relatively little interaction between
U.S. and European forms of competition law until the 1990s.
In the 1990s, these relationships
became far closer and more important for both the U.S. and Europeans. Moreover, the fall of the Soviet
Union precipitated widespread interest in market-based approaches
around the world and revived the
messianic tenor of the U.S. antitrust
law community. Many countries
that had socialist or other command-based approaches to the organization of economic activity now
introduced antitrust laws or significantly increased their investment in
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the enforcement of such laws. Often
they looked to U.S. antitrust officials,
lawyers and scholars for help in implementing or evaluating their new
activities.
B. Policy Issues and Obstacles
This has raised a critically important issue: How will/should
competition law on global markets
be implemented? Globalization has
shown the limitations and distortions of the traditional jurisdictional
system—e.g., differing rules and
procedures for different parts of the
same economic market. Many in
the U.S. and elsewhere believe that
the best response to these problems
is to encourage all countries to follow at least the basic substantive law
approach of the U.S. antitrust law
system. This would generate convergence among competition law systems around the world and reduce
the harms caused by current jurisdictional arrangements. Many others are,
however, skeptical that the U.S. model
should be the focus of convergence.
They often see some form of coordination (perhaps at the World Trade Organization level) as the best response.
How these foreign decision makers and decision shapers understand
and evaluate U.S. antitrust law is
critical to this set of decisions. It is
important, therefore, that they understand as clearly as possible how
U.S. antitrust law works and what
the guiding ideas are behind the law.

Only then will they be in a position
adequately to evaluate it, compare it
with their own systems, and make
informed choices in relation to it.
There are many obstacles—linguistic, comparative, political and economic—to achieving an adequate
understanding of the U.S. system
and of the implications of various
policy choices for the global system
and for individual components of it.
Moreover, it is critical that U.S. lawyers, officials and scholars acquire a
better understanding of the competition law elsewhere and thus of the
potential bases for convergence and
coordination on the global level.
IV. Concluding Comments

A

former U.S. antitrust official not
long ago wrote that U.S. antitrust is (or could be) the “light of the
world.” That might be a bit strong,
but U.S. antitrust certainly does play
a key role in the development of the
global economy and its many components. Now the big question is
whether U.S. legal thinking and the
creative and pragmatic impulses that
have been so much a part of U.S. antitrust law will continue to provide
the leadership that can make the
most of these opportunities.
These changes have important
implications for U.S. legal education.
At Chicago-Kent College of Law,
we are doing our part. Here, and
at some other leading law schools,
these issues have generated increas-
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ing attention. Since the 1980s, and
even more so since the early 1990s, I and
others have included transnational issues
in the domestic antitrust course and
included an antitrust focus in courses
such as international business transactions. I have also long offered a
seminar in international and comparative antitrust law that tackles
these issues directly. These efforts
have two central objectives. One is
to educate U.S. lawyers to perform
more effectively in this new global
context. The other is to educate foreign lawyers about U.S. antitrust law
and provide them with tools for understanding and evaluating it and its
global roles.
One fact stands out in 2013 at the
celebration of Chicago-Kent’s 125
years of teaching law. The U.S. will
have to earn its leading role in antitrust law on the global level. Effective legal education in this area will
be a key element in whether it will be
successful in achieving that goal. ◆
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THE LEGACY OF IN RE NEAGLE
Harold J. Krent

F

or generations, commentators
have decried the fact that we
live in an era of an imperial
presidency. The second President
Bush famously (or infamously) ignored
Congress in subjecting suspected terrorists around the world to military
commissions at Guantánamo Bay and
citizens and suspected terrorists
alike to warrantless surveillance of
their phone calls. President Barack
Obama, like his predecessor, has
used executive power to shape rules
and regulations that Congress had
delegated to subordinates in agencies as opposed to the President
directly. Both Presidents claimed
broad power to circumvent the Senate’s power to consent to treaties and

appointments. Congress and the
courts have fought back to limit the
scope of presidential power, at least
in discrete contexts.
Somewhat lost in history, a comparable battle over executive power
brewed one hundred and twenty-five
years ago, culminating in the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1890 decision in In
re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890). The case
questioned the President’s inherent
authority to assign a U.S. Marshal
to protect the life of Stephen Field, a
sitting United States Supreme Court
Justice. Marshal Neagle confronted
the potential assailant, David Terry,
and killed him when he thought
Justice Field’s life was in danger. California authorities were none too
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pleased given that Terry had been so
prominent in California political life
and that Terry likely was unarmed.
Local officials indicted and then imprisoned Neagle for killing the Californian.
Events leading up to the Supreme
Court decision read like a soap opera,
perhaps revealing more about the
interplay of society and politics than
does the decision itself. The history
of the case starts with David Terry,
who before the Civil War served
on California’s Supreme Court with
Justice Stephen Field. Terry gained
notoriety by challenging Senator
Broderick from California, a former friend who was also a friend of
Field’s, to a duel, which left Broderick dead. The dispute centered over
political rivalries, in part due to
Terry’s sympathy with the Confederacy. Terry was acquitted and then
left California to support the South
in the Civil War. After the war, Terry
returned to law practice and politics
in California and, of relevance here,
within twenty years fell within the
orbit of an apparently glamorous but
unstable woman named Sarah Althea Hill.
In the late 1870s, Hill became
the companion of Senator William
Sharon of Nevada, who had amassed
great sums from real estate and mining investments. Sharon, who was
much older than Hill, evidently sundered relations when he suspected
Hill’s designs on his money. Hill
continued to plot how to separate
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Sharon from some of his enormous
wealth. She made a demand on
Sharon for alimony, asserting that
Sharon had married her some three
years earlier when they had started
their “companionship.” In so doing, she presented what likely were
forged documents attesting to the
marriage relationship. Sharon sued
in federal court in California (due
to diversity of citizenship) in 1883
for a declaration that no marriage
had ever taken place. Hill then filed
her own suit in state court in 1884 to
demonstrate that the marriage was
valid and requested a share of Sharon’s property. She hired Terry as one
of her attorneys.
The state court bizarrely decided
the case in Hill’s favor even though
the judge labeled Hill a liar. Sharon
immediately appealed to the California Supreme Court but died before the case was heard. His executor
pursued the appeal.
In the meantime, the federal suit
proceeded slowly, prompting more
aberrant behavior from Hill. She
sported a pistol at many of the proceedings, and waved it at witnesses.
She threatened to have adverse witnesses and their counsel killed. Although Justice Field, by then serving
on the U.S. Supreme Court, was not
assigned to preside over the case,
he was assigned as a Justice riding
on circuit to hear several motions
arising out of the case. During one
proceeding, Justice Field in an effort
to maintain decorum ordered that
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Ms. Hill be disarmed, and he found
her in contempt of court. At the end
of the proceedings in 1886, the federal court determined that the marriage was a sham and the documents
forged.
Terry then married Hill, manifesting an intriguing view of the
attorney-client relationship. More
importantly, the marriage placed
pressure on his successors on the
California Supreme Court to uphold
the state court finding that Hill had
been married to Sharon. A divided
California Supreme Court acquiesced, affirming the trial court’s decision that a valid marriage had indeed taken place.
In a complicated procedural
move, the estate then moved to revive
the federal court decree and enjoin
both Hill and Terry from maintaining the validity of the prior marriage,
despite the state court ruling. At
this point, the case was assigned to
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Field, sitting by designation. Field
in 1888 determined that Hill had
obtained the marriage documents
through fraud. As he orally delivered
the decision, Hill caused a commotion in the courtroom protesting the
ruling and had to be escorted out.
Terry in a display of chivalry thereupon attacked the marshal for carrying out Field’s order. Field ordered
both Terry, his former associate on
the California Supreme Court, and
Hill imprisoned for contempt of
court. Hill threatened Field’s life,

and Terry claimed that Field’s decision
had been bought with Sharon’s money.
Terry then sought a pardon from
President Grover Cleveland, asserting in part that Field was retaliating
against him for refusing to throw his
support to Field in a prior presidential primary. Cleveland declined, and
Terry served out his short term.
Upon release, Terry apparently
became even more consumed by
revenge, broadcasting widely his
intent to harm Justice Field. When
Justice Field traveled back west from
Washington, newspapers speculated
on when the confrontation would
occur. Accordingly, President Benjamin Harrison through his Attorney
General assigned Marshal Neagle to
protect Justice Field.

T

he confrontation arose in the
summer of 1889 when Field
traveled by train from San Francisco
to Los Angeles. Terry and his wife
boarded the train at a stop along
the way and entered a dining room
in which Justice Field was eating
breakfast. Hill left the room—presumably to gather her pistol from her
chamber—but her husband did not
wait and circled behind Justice Field
and delivered two blows to his head.
Neagle, the marshal, announced his
presence and called on Terry to stop.
Terry made a move as if to draw a
knife that he customarily carried,
and Neagle responded with two
shots from his pistol, killing the
assailant.
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Illustration, San Francisco Examiner, 1888, shows Terry attacking a marshal for removing
Mrs. Terry from the courtroom, U.S. Marshals website, http://www.justice.gov/marshals.

A local constable arrested Neagle on the spot. Ms. Terry, upon her
return to San Francisco, swore out a
complaint for murder against both
Field and Neagle. California authorities then arrested Field, who was
released under a bond. An eastern
newspaper reported the following
imaginary dialogue:
Newsboy: “Man tried to kill a judge
in California!”
Customer: “What was done about it?”
Newsboy: “Oh! They arrested the
judge.”

Field immediately filed for a writ of
habeas corpus, and the federal court
within a matter of days granted
Justice Field’s writ, ending Justice
Field’s stay at the other end of the
courtroom.

Marshal Neagle was not as fortunate—he unquestionably fired
the shots that killed Terry. He filed
a similar writ of habeas corpus from
a California prison, asserting that
he acted within the line of duty in
protecting Justice Field’s life. He was
moved to San Francisco, but remained
behind bars. He argued that, to the extent his actions were undertaken pursuant to federal authority, his conduct
could only be challenged in federal
court. The federal court eventually
scheduled a hearing, and upheld the
writ, reasoning in part that “upon
general, immutable principles, the
power must be necessarily inherent
in the executive department of any
government worthy of the name of
government, to protect itself in all
matters to which its authority extends; and this necessarily involves
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Supreme Court decision in In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), photo by Emily Barney.

the power to protect all the agency
and instrumentalities necessary to
accomplish the objects and purposes
of government.” The Supreme Court
accepted the case for review at California’s request.
On one level, In re Neagle reflects
the generation-old conflict inherent
in our system of federalism. Some
Californians were resentful that the
federal courts did not respect the
state courts’ determination that a
valid marriage had been entered into
between Hill and Sharon. Moreover,
authorities in California were more
than willing to imprison and indict
a U.S. Marshal, even when the Marshal was following presidential orders. Others in California believed
that California courts should be
trusted to determine whether Neagle’s defense was valid without interference from the federal courts.
Whatever one thinks of the resurgent importance of federalism in our

generation—including petitions for
secession filed in the wake of President Obama’s 2012 victory—few
proponents today would be so bold
as to approve of California’s imprisonment of a U.S. Marshal who
unquestionably was acting pursuant to the President’s orders, not to
mention local authorities’ decision
to arrest Justice Field himself. The
story reminds us that, no matter
how intense regional divides may be
today, they pale before the tensions
between states and the federal government over a century ago.
But, the facts underlying the case
reveal more—a sordid tale of love
gone awry, reminiscent of politicians’ struggles more recently, from
Senator Gary Hart’s famed ride on
the aptly named boat “Monkey Business” to President Bill Clinton’s fling
with an intern, and from Wilbur
Mills’ dalliance with the Argentinian
stripper Fanne Foxe to Representa-
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tive Anthony Weiner’s more recent
debacle of sexting. Politicians’ affairs
impact not only political races, but
Supreme Court decisions as well.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997),
was not the first Supreme Court case
on presidential power sparked by
politicians’ sexual misconduct.

T

he doctrinal legacy of In re
Neagle endures. A divided U.S.
Supreme Court, with Justice Field
recusing himself, held that the President enjoys a residuum of authority
under Article II of the Constitution
to take steps to protect the nation
even if those steps are not spelled
out by Congress. In presaging presidential power debates of the last
decade, the Court concluded that
the President could rely on powers not directly rooted in the text
of the Constitution in safeguarding
the country. The Court explained,
“In the view we take of the Constitution of the United States, any obligation fairly and properly inferrible
from that instrument” is appropriate, including the duty to protect a
Supreme Court Justice, even in the
absence of explicit congressional
authorization. The Court continued
that “it would be a great reproach
to the system of government of the
United States, declared to be within
its sphere sovereign and supreme, if
there is to be found within the domain of its powers no means of protecting the judges, in the conscientious and faithful discharge of their
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duties, from the malice and hatred of
those upon whom their judgments
may operate unfavorably.” Presidents
can “infer” powers from the Constitution—including the duty to protect Justices from harm. In the case,
those nonstatutory or “inferrible”
powers displaced California’s authority to try Neagle for murder and
provided Neagle a complete defense
to the charge. Although the accumulation of powers and responsibilities
over the last 125 years has radically
transformed the presidency, the debate over the scope of presidential
powers under Article II is not new.
There is a residuum of authority under Article II—even if the extent remains in bitter dispute—permitting
presidents leeway to ensure protection of the government and the nation itself. ◆
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“First woman jury, Los Angeles,” photo by Bain News Service, 1911, Bain Collection, Library of Congress.

THE CHANGING COMPOSITION
OF THE AMERICAN JURY
Nancy S. Marder

W

hen Chicago-Kent College of Law was founded
125 years ago, many of
our key legal institutions, such as the
jury, were well established. By 1888,
the year of our school’s founding, the
jury was seen as an institution that
provided justice in a nation created
by a revolution of “we the people.”
Although it no longer seems remarkable to us today, the jury system gave
ordinary citizens, untutored in the
law, the power to decide cases and to
dispense justice.
Today, reinforced by movies,
television shows, and constant media coverage, the American people
have two deeply-held views about

the jury. The first is that the jury is
meant to represent all of us—“we
the people”—by reflecting our diversity as much as is practical. In
every high-profile jury case, much
attention is paid to the diversity of
the jury. In particular, we care about
race and gender more than almost
any other characteristics. Although
the diversity of the venire is enshrined in several Supreme Court
cases, the diversity of the petit jury
is reinforced by the portrayal of the
jury in popular culture.
The second widely-held view is
that the jury has one job, and that is
to determine the facts. Although a
jury trial is presided over by a judge
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and involves decision-making about
the law, the jury ostensibly plays no
role in determining which laws apply or what standards should be met.
This arrangement seems sensible because the judge and lawyers bring to
the trial legal expertise that the jurors do not have.
While these two views are well
accepted, the students in our first
law class in 1888 would be shocked
to learn what our first-year students
now take for granted. Though our
modern impulse is to assume that
a jury should reflect the diversity
of our community, at one time that
diversity was limited to white men
of property. Our broader understanding of diversity has been the
result of a hard-fought struggle to
extend the rights of jury service to
African-American men and later
to women. This expansion of jury
rights, however, has not been continuous; rather, it has proceeded in fits
and starts. In fact, African-American men in some states in the South
were given the right to serve as jurors
during Reconstruction only to have
that right stripped away by the end
of the 1800s before being restored
decades later. So, too, with women
in the Western territories; they had
the right to serve as jurors in the late
1800s, but it was short-lived.
It will also surprise the modern
reader to discover that the role of the
jury was initially to decide both the
law and the facts. The diminution
of the role of the jury, so that it de-
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cided only the facts, happened gradually from about 1850 to the 1930s.
Some researchers believe that as the
practice of law became more professional, the distinction widened between judges and lawyers who knew
the law and ordinary citizens who
did not, until it made little sense for
jurors to decide the law.
I offer a more radical theory in
which I see a connection between
the growing diversity of the jury and
the declining power of the jury. My
theory is that the white, male legal
establishment began to curtail the
power of the jury as African-American men and women had the right
to serve on juries. Although African-American men and women lost
that right by the late 1800s, they regained it, albeit after much struggle,
many decades later. For both groups,
however, even when official barriers
were eliminated, other practices kept
them from actually being seated on
juries. Some of these practices, such
as the peremptory challenge, are still
used today in a discriminatory manner, in spite of Supreme Court cases
to the contrary, in an effort to keep
African-American men and women
from being seated on juries.
The Exclusion of African-American
Men from the Jury

A

lbert Alschuler and Andrew
Deiss, in an article entitled A
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
the United States, identified 1860 as
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the year in which African-American
men first served on a jury. In that
year, two African-American men sat
on a jury in Worcester, Massachusetts. In 1864, Congress passed legislation that allowed African-American men to testify in federal courts,
and this was followed by legislation
that allowed them to testify in state
courts. Jury service was soon to follow.
During Reconstruction (1863–
1877), African-American men served
on juries in some states. For example,
in South Carolina in 1869, the legislature mandated not only the integration of grand and petit juries,
but also that the racial composition
of the jury should approximate that
of the community. Similarly, in New
Orleans between 1872 and 1878,
one-third of the citizens summoned
for jury duty were African-Americans, and this percentage matched
their representation in Orleans
Parish. Between 1870 and 1884 in
Washington County, Texas, where
African-Americans were approximately 50 percent of the population,
they constituted about 30 percent of
those who served on juries. During
the 1870s, in Warren County, Mississippi, African-Americans were
about 35 percent of the grand jurors,
and even though that percentage did
not approximate their percentage in
the community (where they were 70
percent of the community), it was a
significant improvement over their
total exclusion in the past.

Newspapers, in their reporting of
jury trials during this period, noted
when an African-American man
(and they were only men) served as
a juror. On January 15, 1884, in the
Chicago Daily Tribune, one story
questioned whether South Carolina
jurors in a particular case had voted
to convict based on their political
parties; it included the following observation: “Three of the jurors, one
a negro and two white men, refused
to find a verdict of guilty.” On February 16, 1885, in the Chicago Daily
Tribune, a story described a murder
trial in New Orleans and mentioned
the sole African-American juror on
this jury: “The only juror who stood
out from the very beginning in favor of conviction was one Edwards,
a negro, and the only negro on the
jury, and he maintained his manly
and honest position to the end, notwithstanding that [the defendant’s]
friends went to his house while he
was serving and threatened his family with violence.”
The newspaper accounts also
noted when the African-American
juror was the first African-American to serve in that locale. A brief
story on May 6, 1891, in the New
York Times announced that a man
named Nelson Stark, described as
“colored,” had been selected as the
eleventh juror in the Garrison murder trial. The story noted that “[it] is
the first time in the history of that
county [in West Virginia] that a colored man has sat on an important
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“Negroes as Jurors,” New York Times headline, Nov. 3, 1885.

case in the State court.” Similarly,
on September 7, 1880, the Chicago
Daily Tribune noted that “[f]or the
first time in the history of Kentucky
the panel of jurymen for the duty
in a criminal court included in the
list of the Louisville Circuit Court
to-day three colored men.” Two of
those men were selected to serve on
a grand jury and the third man was
selected for a petit jury. The article
noted that there were a number of
African-Americans at court that day
and “they evidently took great satisfaction in seeing representatives of
their race assume privileges heretofore denied them.”
The inclusion of African-American men on the jury was not limited
to Southern states. A notice in the
New York Times on November 19,
1890, announced that “[a]mong the
jurors in a case in the Circuit Court
this morning was Abe Peterson, a
Grafton blacksmith, who is the first
colored man to sit on a jury in Renssalaer County[, New York].” On July
9, 1893, a lengthy story in the Chicago Daily Tribune reported that for
the first time in Madison, Wiscon-

sin, an all-African-American jury
(six jurors) heard a civil case involving an assault and battery; the article noted that this jury marked “an
inauguration of a new judicial era.”
Newspaper accounts of jury trials also reported on perceived differences between white jurors and
African-American jurors. According to one story in the Chicago Daily
Tribune on July 10, 1880, “[t]he first
negro juror in Atlanta, the other day,
promptly joined in convicting a negro who was put on trial.” As a result
of African-Americans’ seeming proclivity to convict, “[t]he next prisoner, also a negro, objected to having one of his own race on the jury.”
Another story, published in the New
York Times on November 3, 1885,
also observed that African-American jurors had been “decidedly
in favor of the Commonwealth as
against colored offenders.” The article suggested that African-American
jurors wanted to show that they were
committed to law and order—so
much so that older lawyers who had
African-American clients would not
select African-American jurors be-
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cause “they claim[ed] that colored
jurors are more severe in meting
out punishment to offenders of their
race.”
In spite of constitutional protections provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment (1868) and the Fifteenth
Amendment (1870), statutory protections provided by the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, the Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1875, and the Federal
Jury Selection Act of 1879, and a
U.S. Supreme
Court case,
Strauder
v.
West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303
(1880), which
held that a state
statute
disqualifying African-American men from jury service was
unconstitutional, African-American
men lost their place on juries in the
South in the 1890s. Booker T. Washington observed at the end of the
nineteenth century: “In the whole
of Georgia & Alabama, and other
Southern states not a negro juror is
allowed to sit in the jury box in state
courts.” According to a 1910 study,
African-Americans rarely served on
juries in Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and
Virginia, and they never served on
juries in Alabama and Georgia. In
sum, according to another commen“Jury of Whites and Blacks,” illustration by James E.
Taylor, 1867, Library of Congress.

tator, Douglas Colbert, “[a]lthough
it was common for blacks to have
served as jurors during Reconstruction, they virtually disappeared from
the southern jury box by 1900, even
in counties where they constituted
an overwhelming majority of the local population.”
Even though statutes could no
longer prohibit African-American
men from serving on the jury after
Strauder, other practices kept them
from the jury
box.
James
Forman, in Juries and Race
in the Nineteenth
Century, described
the violence
directed toward
African-Americans and white Republicans that kept African-American
men in the South from serving as
jurors or witnesses, or seeking or
being afforded the protection of the
legal system. All-white Southern juries failed to convict the white perpetrators of these crimes.
Nonviolent and more subtle
practices also kept African-Americans from actually being seated on
a jury, even if they had been summoned to serve. These practices
ranged from color-coding by race
the names placed in the wheel from
which jurors were selected to the
discretion exercised by white jury
commissioners in selecting only
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white men whom they knew to serve
as jurors. Mississippi’s 1892 law,
which allowed three state officials to
select jurors based on their “good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair
character,” was another way to keep
African-Americans off the jury;
other Southern states followed suit.
The practice of discriminatory
peremptory challenges, which continues to this day, was another way
to keep African-Americans from
being selected for petit juries. Each
party could exercise a certain number of peremptories and use them
to remove prospective jurors without giving any reason at all. Parties
used their peremptory challenges to
remove African-Americans from the
jury. Prosecutors, in particular, exercised race-based peremptories to remove African-Americans from the
jury in criminal cases in which the
defendant was African-American.
Even after a number of cases, from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, in
which the Supreme Court developed
an elaborate framework to attempt
to counter the exercise of race-based
peremptory challenges, the practice
continues today. Lawyers have simply learned ways to avoid discovery.
In some courts in the South, defense
lawyers in capital cases will not even
challenge the prosecutor’s use of a
race-based peremptory because they
know the judge will never find a peremptory to be discriminatory. The
practice of exercising discriminatory
peremptory challenges persists, even
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though it is undertaken in more subtle ways than it once was.
The Exclusion of Women from the Jury

W

omen’s experience in serving as jurors tracked African-American men’s experience in
some ways, but lagged behind by
many years. Before 1888, women in
at least two Western territories were
permitted to serve as jurors, and in
1898 women in Utah were permitted
to serve as jurors. Wyoming Territory gave women the right to vote
and to sit on juries in 1869, with the
first woman sitting on a jury in Laramie, Wyoming, in 1871. However,
there is some dispute as to when
Wyoming women lost their right to
sit on juries. Albert Alschuler and
Andrew Deiss point to 1872 as the
year that “Wyoming’s experiment in
equality in the courtroom” came to
an end, and a New York Times article on November 19, 1883, claimed
that “no woman [in Wyoming] is
ever seen nowadays in the jury box.”
However, in an article in the Chicago
Daily Tribune on October 26, 1891,
the first Governor of the State of
Wyoming was interviewed and said
that there had been “several women
jurors in the courts of Cheyenne, the
Capital of Wyoming.” The Wyoming
Almanac of Politics included an article from the Cheyenne Daily Leader,
dated September 17, 1891, describing a trial in which the defendant
was female as were two of the jurors.
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In 1884, women in Washington Territory had the right to vote and to
serve on juries. However, in 1887,
after a change in personnel on the
Supreme Court of Washington Territory, women lost their right to sit on
juries. In 1898, Utah allowed women
to serve as jurors, and has traditionally been credited as the first state to
do so, though women rarely served
as jurors until the 1930s.
Although there were few women
serving as jurors in the 1880s, there
were occasional ruminations about
what women jurors would be like
and what difference they would
make on juries. In a brief note in
the Chicago Daily Tribune on April
21, 1888, entitled Call for Feminine
Jurors, the writer suggested that it is
difficult to convict a female defendant on the West Coast, and perhaps
if women were permitted to serve as
jurors this situation would change.
The writer offered the following recommendation: “It would be a good
thing if the rights of women could
be so extended that in cases where
a woman is accused of crime she
might be tried by a jury of her own
sex.” On June 28, 1893, there was a
brief article in the Chicago Daily
Tribune entitled Women as Jurors,
which raised the question whether
Lizzie Borden should have been
tried by a jury that included women
because “a woman on trial for her
life should have the right to demand
an equal representation of women
on the jury.” However, the same ar-

ticle also suggested that whenever
the defendant is a woman, “there
are few men not predisposed to regard the opposite sex with tender
consideration.” In 1893, the Senate
Judiciary Committee held a hearing
to consider a bill that would allow
women to serve as jurors if they “are
wives of men who are duly qualified
so to act,” according to an article in
the New York Times on February 1,
1893. The article reported that Dr.
Mary Walker spoke in support of the
bill, but the bill did not go forward.
Women thought the passage
of the Nineteenth Amendment in
1920, which gave them the right to
vote, would also give them the right
to serve on juries, but this proved
not to be the case in most states.
According to Professor Gretchen
Ritter, around the time of the Nineteenth Amendment, 14 states granted
women the right to serve on the jury.
In seven of these states, new laws
were passed that gave women the
right to serve. In the other seven
states, jury-qualification statutes described jurors as “electors,” so once
women became electors under the
Nineteenth Amendment, they automatically became eligible to serve as
jurors. However, other states, like Illinois, rejected this idea. The Illinois
Supreme Court reasoned that at the
time when the Illinois General Assembly used the term “electors” only
men could be electors. If women
were to be included as “electors,”
then it was up to the Illinois General
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Assembly to say so, which it did,
though not until 1939.
States decided whether to allow
women to serve on juries in their
own courts, and the federal courts
followed the practice of the state in
which the federal court was located.
It was not until the Civil Rights Act
of 1957 that federal courts allowed
women to serve as jurors in federal
courts regardless of the practice
of that state’s courts. State courts,
even when they ostensibly permitted women to serve as jurors,
followed practices that kept many
women from actually serving. In
some states, women had automatic
exemptions from jury duty. In other
states, such as Florida and Louisiana,
women could serve as jurors, but
only if they went down to the courthouse and affirmatively registered
for service, which was an extra step
that men did not have to take. States
that adhered to this practice claimed
that it respected women’s role in the
home and that most women would
be unable to serve because of their
duties at home. The effect of affirmative registration was that very few
women registered for jury service.
As late as 1961, this practice was upheld in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961), and was not found to be unconstitutional until Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975).
Even after the demise of affirmative registration, the exercise of
peremptory challenges was another
way to keep women from serving
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as jurors. Although women were
summoned to serve, they could be
struck from the petit jury by lawyers
exercising gender-based peremptory
challenges. Whereas race-based peremptory challenges were addressed
by the Supreme Court in a series of
cases spanning from the mid-1960s
to the mid-1990s, this line of cases
did not become applicable to gender until J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). Although
there are many reasons that lawyers
defend the peremptory challenge—
from giving defendants control over
jury selection to ridding the jury
of an outlier who could not be dismissed for cause—the peremptory
challenge also should be seen as a
practice that has been, and continues to be, used to keep women and
African-Americans from serving on
juries.
A Decline in Jury Power

B

ack in 1888, when African-American men had for all
intents and purposes lost their right
to serve on juries and the few women
in Western territories still had their
short-lived right to serve on juries,
the jury had begun to experience
a decline in power. Whereas the
jury—from colonial times until the
1850s—had always had the power to
decide the law and the facts, the jury
started to lose its power to decide
the law and was reduced to deciding
only the facts. This loss came about
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through state court interpretations
of state statutes and constitutions.
This loss could be seen in a number
of states, including Massachusetts
in 1855 and Louisiana in 1871, and
soon spread to other states, including Georgia in 1879 and Vermont in
1892. Today, only two states, Indiana
and Maryland, still instruct jurors
that they have the right to determine
the law as well as the facts. Although
these two states’ constitutions provide for this right, the judiciary in
both states has narrowed this right
through case law.
My own theory is that as African-American men and women
sought to serve on juries, there was
a move on the part of judges to limit
the power of juries. Some commentators suggest that this move came
about because of the growing professionalization of judges. As judges received legal training and saw themselves as professionals, they began
to see the functions of judges and
juries as distinct, and attempted to
limit juries to the fact-finding function only. Another possibility is that
as the law grew more complex, it
seemed appropriate for professionals
with training and knowledge to decide it, rather than citizens who had
only common sense and experience
to guide them. My own theory is that
the move to limit the function of the
jury to fact-finding came about at a
time when outsiders—women and
African-Americans—were trying to
claim a right to serve as jurors. Al-

though African-American men and
women had not yet been able to secure their right to serve, the writing
was on the wall.
Thus, the late 1880s were a time
of transformation for the jury. Juries
in many states had lost their power
to decide the law, and were officially
limited to finding the facts. It is no
coincidence that this occurred at a
time when African-American men
and women had experienced the
right to serve as jurors, albeit briefly,
and sought to recover that right,
even though it would take them
many years to do so. ◆
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Supreme Court decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
THE SUPREME COURT: THEN AND NOW
David S. Rudstein

A

fter examining the United
States Reports containing
the cases decided by the Supreme Court during its 1887–88
term, one might conclude that the
United States in the late 1880s was
a law-abiding country with little
crime. Of the approximately 270
cases decided by the Court during
that term, only seven (2.6 percent)
raised issues of criminal law or procedure. In contrast, in its most recently completed term, 2011–12, the
Supreme Court decided 76 cases, 22
(29 percent) of which involved issues of criminal law or procedure.
What accounts for this dramatic
rise in the number (and percentage)

of criminal law or procedure cases
decided by the Supreme Court? No
one would deny that crime in the
United States has increased since
1888. But the true explanation for
the increased number of criminal law
and procedure cases decided by the
Supreme Court is the “constitutionalization” of criminal procedure. When
originally adopted in 1791, the Bill of
Rights (the first eight amendments to
the U.S. Constitution) placed limitations only upon the Federal Government, not upon the individual States.
Consequently, none of the rights provided in those amendments—such
as the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures (Fourth
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Amendment), the guarantee against
double jeopardy (Fifth Amendment),
the privilege against self-incrimination (Fifth Amendment), the right
to counsel (Sixth Amendment), the
right to a jury trial (Sixth Amendment), and the right to confront hostile witnesses (Sixth Amendment)—
applied in criminal prosecutions
brought in state courts. Hence, an
individual convicted of a crime in a
state court could not challenge his or
her conviction in the U.S. Supreme
Court on the ground that he or she
had been denied a right guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights. Many states did
of course have their own constitutional provisions guaranteeing various rights to those accused of crime
in their own courts, but each state
could interpret its own constitutional
provisions, and many of these provisions turned out to be less protective
of individual rights than their federal
counterparts. Moreover, since these
were rights guaranteed by state law,
rather than federal law, their alleged
violation did not raise a federal issue
that could be adjudicated by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Even in 1888, after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment—which, among other things,
prohibits a State from abridging
the “privileges and immunities” of
United States citizens (“Privileges
and Immunities Clause”) and from
“depriving any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of
law” (“Due Process Clause”)—the
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Bill of Rights still provided no protection to state criminal defendants.
Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court recognized that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment protected some individual rights from
state infringement, including, perhaps, some safeguarded by the Bill
of Rights against National action.
Nevertheless, the Court expressly
stated that if the Due Process Clause
protected such latter rights, it was
not because they were enumerated
in the first eight amendments. It explained that the Due Process Clause
protected only those rights that are
“the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty” and essential to “a fair
and enlightened system of justice.”
In determining whether a particular safeguard met this standard, the
Court asked whether “a civilized system could be imagined that would
not accord the particular protection.” Applying this test, the Supreme
Court held that several of the protections contained in the Bill of Rights,
including the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to a grand
jury indictment, did not apply to the
States. Even when the Court held that
a particular right enumerated in the
Bill of Rights fell within the concept
of due process, it frequently concluded that the protection afforded
against state infringement was less
than that afforded against infringement by the Federal Government—
a “watered-down” version of the right.
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Supreme Court agreed; it reversed
the conviction (and life sentence)
and, despite Palko’s implicit acquittal
for that offense, ordered a new trial
for first-degree murder. At the second trial, a jury convicted Palko of
first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death—a conviction and
sentence that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld against a claim that
Palko’s second trial had placed him
twice in jeopardy for first-degree
murder.

To illustrate, although the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against
double jeopardy precluded the
Government in a federal criminal
prosecution from appealing a jury
verdict—whether a conviction or
an acquittal—that protection did
not apply in state court proceedings.
Consequently, in the mid-1930s,
after a Connecticut jury considering a charge of first-degree murder
against Frank Palko convicted him
of second-degree murder (thereby
implicitly acquitting him of the original charge of first-degree murder),
the State, acting pursuant to a state
statute, sought review of the conviction. The State claimed the trial
judge had erred in instructing the
jury on first-degree murder and in
excluding certain evidence from the
prosecution’s case. The Connecticut
Photo of Clarence Earl Gideon, 1961(?), State
Archives of Florida, Florida Memory, RC12789.

T

hroughout the 1940s and 1950s,
the Supreme Court consistently
rejected the view, persuasively argued by Justice Hugo L. Black, that
the Fourteenth Amendment had “incorporated” the entire Bill of Rights
and made its provisions applicable to
the States to the same extent as they
applied to the Federal Government.
Even as late as 1961, despite the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee that an accused in a criminal prosecution “shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense,” an
indigent being tried in a state court
for a noncapital felony had no federal
constitutional right to have counsel
appointed to represent him or her.
Thus, when Clarence Earl Gideon, an
indigent drifter being tried in a Florida state court for breaking and entering a poolroom, requested the trial
court to appoint counsel to represent
him, the judge could respond:
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Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent
you in this case. Under the laws of
the State of Florida, the only time
the Court can appoint Counsel to
represent a Defendant is when that
person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have
to deny your request to appoint
Counsel to defend you in this case.

During the 1960s, however, under the leadership of Chief Justice
Earl Warren, the Supreme Court
adopted the position that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment “selectively incorporated” various provisions of the Bill
of Rights and made them applicable
to the States. Using this approach,
the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, the
Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial, and, in overturning Clarence
Earl Gideon’s conviction, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel were
among the rights safeguarded from
infringement by the states. In 1968,
the Court explained that it had reformulated its test for determining
whether a particular provision of
the Bill of Rights was incorporated
by the Fourteenth Amendment. It
stated:
The recent cases . . . have proceeded upon the valid assumption that state criminal processes
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are not imaginary and theoretical
schemes but actual systems bearing
virtually every characteristic of the
common-law system that has been
developing virtually contemporaneously in England and in this country.
The question thus is whether given
this kind of system a particular procedure is fundamental—whether,
that is, a procedure is necessary to
an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty. [Emphasis added.]

Today, virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights safeguarding the rights of a criminal defendant
apply to the States (the lone exception
being the right to an indictment). As
a result, the Supreme Court each
term receives hundreds of petitions
requesting it to review a state-court
conviction alleged to have been obtained in violation of the defendant’s
federal constitutional rights, and each
year the Court decides 20 or so cases
involving such issues, a large percentage of the number of cases it decides
each term with written opinions. ◆
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Chicago-Kent in 1973, serving as Associate
Dean from 1983 to 1987. He has focused
his scholarship on criminal procedure.
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“Our overworked Supreme Court,” Puck cartoon by Joseph Keppler, 1885, Library of Congress.

A “PROGRESSIVE CONTRACTION OF JURISDICTION”:
THE MAKING OF THE MODERN SUPREME COURT
Carolyn Shapiro

T

he Supreme Court in 1888
was in crisis. Its structure
and responsibilities, created
a century earlier by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, were no longer adequate or appropriate. The Court was
overwhelmed by its docket, and the
justices’ responsibilities, which included circuit riding, were impossible to meet. Shaped as it was by
a law almost as old as the country
itself, the Supreme Court in 1888—
and the federal judicial system as a
whole—would be barely recognizable to many today.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established not only the Supreme Court,
but also the entire federal court

system. The Act divided the country initially into thirteen districts,
which were in turn combined into
three circuits. Unlike today’s circuit
courts, however, the circuit courts
created in 1789 had original jurisdiction over certain types of cases and
provided appellate review of only
a few cases heard originally in the
district courts. In addition, the Judiciary Act provided for district court
judges and Supreme Court justices,
but no circuit court judges. Instead,
twice a year, two Supreme Court
justices would visit each district and,
along with one district court judge,
would sit as the circuit court. There
were six Supreme Court justices, so
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that two could be assigned to each
circuit. Even after 1793, when subsequent laws provided that only
one Supreme Court justice at a time
would sit on a circuit court, meaning
that each justice had to make the trip
only once a year rather than twice,
an enormous portion of Supreme
Court justices’ time was spent riding
circuit—at a time when travel was
slow and difficult. And as the country grew, more circuits were created.
Not only did Supreme Court
justices ride circuit, but the Supreme
Court itself had no discretion over
its docket. Cases were appealed to
the Supreme Court as of right, unlike
today. This lack of control turned out
to be extremely problematic. During
the first century of its existence, not
only did the United States become
geographically larger and more populous, but industry grew, the country’s economy became increasingly
sophisticated, and new laws and
sources of litigation abounded, especially after the Civil War. As a result,
the Supreme Court’s docket grew
dramatically. At the beginning of the
1888 Term, there were 1,563 cases on
the docket. The Court simply could
not keep up. As Felix Frankfurter
and James M. Landis described
the situation: “The Supreme Court
docket became a record of arrears.”
Less poetically, it took three years for
a case to be heard. The situation was
untenable.
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Faced with overwhelming caseloads, by 1888 the Supreme Court
had already attempted to adjust its
standard of review in order to dissuade lawyers and litigants from
appealing fact-intensive cases with
few implications beyond the particular parties. In Newell v. Norton and
Ship, an 1865 admiralty case involving a steamboat collision, for example, the Court summarily affirmed
the verdict for the plaintiff, holding
that there was “ample testimony to
support the decision.” The Court
explained that it would not engage
in a searching review of the lengthy
record, which included more than
100 depositions:
Parties ought not to expect this court
to revise their decrees merely on a
doubt raised in our minds as to the
correctness of their judgment, on
the credibility of witnesses, or the
weight of conflicting testimony.

The Court’s reluctance to engage
in error correction, even at a time when
it had no formal control of its docket,
continues to this day. Today, Supreme
Court Rule 10, Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certiorari,
explains that a “petition for a writ of
certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous
factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”
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D

espite the Court’s effort to define a very narrow scope of review, it was unable to halt the flood
of cases coming to it. Facing both its
own swelling docket and the geographic expansion of the country,
the justices found circuit riding to be
increasingly difficult and they often
simply did not do it. As Frankfurter
and Landis explain, “[B]y 1890 the
statutory duty of the Justices to attend circuit was practically a dead
letter.”
And it was not the Supreme
Court alone that was unable to function properly. Despite some earlier
attempts to expand and reform the
lower courts, there were still not
nearly enough judges. Circuit courts,
which were supposed to sit with two
judges, often had to function with
only one. Even more problematic,
that single judge was often a district
court judge who was hearing appeals
of his own decisions. In 1889, a paper presented at the Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association put
it this way:
Such an appeal is not from Philip
drunk to Philip sober, but from
Philip sober to Philip intoxicated
with the vanity of a matured opinion and doubtless also a published
decision.

This arrangement could not possibly
inspire confidence in an impartial
and fair justice system.
Congress finally acted in 1891,

after many years of considering and
rejecting proposals for major reform,
and the federal judicial system we
know today began to emerge. Most
significantly, Congress established
intermediate appellate courts for the
first time. If litigants were required
to appeal first to those intermediate
courts, the hope was, many fewer of
them would subsequently take their
cases to the Supreme Court. The law
indeed appeared to lessen the tide of
cases, at least at first. During 1890,
before passage, 623 new cases were
docketed at the Supreme Court. In
1892, the number dropped by more
than half, to 275.
The 1891 law, known as the Evarts
Act, also contained the seeds of today’s Court’s largely discretionary
jurisdiction. For the first time, Congress created a category of cases that
the Supreme Court would review
only upon certification, or certiorari,
although most cases continued to
flow to the Court as a matter of right.
The Supreme Court embraced
the opportunity to limit the number of cases coming before it. During the first two years after passage
of the 1891 act, it granted certiorari
in only two cases. While careful
to maintain its power to grant certiorari in any case pending in the
courts of appeals, the Court was,
quite deliberately, “chary of action in
respect to certiorari,” as it explained
in Forsyth v. City of Hammond, decided in 1897. In Forsyth, the Court
announced narrow criteria for when
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“The Supreme Court/Men Who Know the Law,” October Term, 1895. Designed by the American Lithographic Co.,
1896, Collection of the Supreme Court of the United States.

certiorari would be appropriate:
[The certiorari] power will be
sparingly exercised, and only when
the circumstances of the case satisfy us that the importance of the
question involved, the necessity of
avoiding conflict between two or
more courts of appeal, or between
courts of appeal and the courts of a
state, or some matter affecting the
interests of this nation in its internal or external relations, demands
such exercise.

These criteria remain, largely unchanged, the stated criteria for certiorari today as set forth in Supreme
Court Rule 10.
The Evarts Act, however, was
not successful in its goal of cutting
the Court’s workload to a manageable size. It did not eliminate most

of the Court’s mandatory appellate
jurisdiction. The hope that the creation of the intermediate appellate
courts would satisfy litigants’ need
for appellate review, thereby making
an appeal to the Supreme Court less
attractive, proved largely illusory.
(Lawyers and litigants often apparently used the right of an appeal to
the Supreme Court simply as a delaying tactic, a possibility that seems
entirely obvious to a modern legal
audience.) In the years following the
enactment of the Evarts Act, the Supreme Court’s caseloads increased
again to unmanageable proportions,
as the nation, its economy, and its
judicial business continued to grow.
Moreover, even after 1891 and despite the concern for the Supreme
Court’s caseload that inspired the
Evarts Act, Congress continued to
create even more categories of man-
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datory appeals to the Court. In 1903,
for example, it passed the Expediting
Act, which created the three-judge
district court to hear certain antitrust cases. Appeals from this type
of district court went directly to the
Supreme Court as of right. And over
the following 10 to 15 years, Congress provided that more and more
types of cases follow this procedure.
(A handful of cases, such as constitutional challenges to congressional
districts, are subject to this procedure even today.)
Although it expanded the Court’s
mandatory jurisdiction in some areas, Congress did cut back on it in
others. In 1916, for example, Congress eliminated mandatory jurisdiction over Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases, as well as certain
cases arising out of state courts, cases
from the Philippines, and cases arising under certain other federal statutes. The most significant overhaul
of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction,
however, was the 1925 Judges’ Bill—
so called because it was drafted by
members of the Supreme Court itself. The Act dramatically expanded
the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction,
leaving only a few, relatively small
categories of cases for mandatory
appeals.
The goal of the Judges’ Bill, like
the Evarts Act, was to free the Court
from having to decide cases that were
not important to anyone beyond
the immediate parties involved and
to allow it to focus on more nation-

ally significant matters. The House
Committee report on the Judges’ Bill
explained:
The problem is whether the time
and attention and energy of the
court shall be devoted to matters
of large public concern, or whether
they shall be consumed by matters
of less concern, without especial
general interest, and only because
the litigant wants to have the court
of last resort pass upon his right.

In a 1925 Yale Law Review article,
Chief Justice William Howard Taft
provided more detail about what
sorts of cases he believed the Court
should take on certiorari after passage of the Judges’ Bill, reiterating
the criteria the Court first articulated in the 1890s—and that today
are embodied in Rule 10:
The function of the Supreme
Court is conceived to be . . . the
consideration of cases whose decision involves principles, the application of which are of wide public or governmental interest, and
which should be authoritatively
declared by the final court. Such
cases should include issues of the
Federal constitutional validity of
statutes, Federal and State, genuine
issues of constitutional rights of
individuals, the interpretation of
Federal statutes when it will affect
large classes of people, questions
of Federal jurisdiction, and some-
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times doubtful questions of general law of such wide application
that the Supreme Court may help
remove the doubt. Where there
is a conflict of opinion between
intermediate appellate courts in
the different Circuits or between
the Federal intermediate appellate
courts and the Supreme Courts of
the States, the public interest certainly requires that the Supreme
Court hear the cases, if its decision
will remove the conflict.

The Judges’ Bill did not completely eliminate caseload pressures,
of course. Petitions for certiorari alone
topped 5,000 a year by the early 1980s.
In October Term 2011, the Court considered more than 7,500 petitions,
although this number represents a
modest decrease from prior years.
Despite these massive numbers,
however, the Court has not fallen
behind in dealing with these filings.
Instead, it has adopted a variety
of ways of dealing with them efficiently—from eliminating the need
to discuss a petition in the justices’
conference unless at least one justice
wants to consider it, to relying on
law clerks to read the petitions and
summarize them in brief memos.
This latter mechanism relies heavily
on the “cert pool”—a cooperative
agreement among most of the jus
tices (currently, all but Justice Alito)
in which the petitions are divided
among the chambers and each petition
is assigned to a single law clerk. The
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cert pool was introduced in the 1970s.
For cases decided on the merits,
however, the Court continued to
feel greatly burdened by its workload in the mid- to late twentieth
century, even as the number of merits
cases shrank. In the 1980s, the Court
heard argument and issued written
opinions in approximately 150 cases
a year. Many observers, and some of
the justices themselves, believed that
150 cases were simply too many for
the Court to handle well. Moreover,
these people argued, the Court was
unable to give truly important cases
the time and attention they needed
in part because of the need to manage the mandatory appeals, which
were often not of interest beyond the
parties themselves. There was much
discussion of some kind of national
court of appeals or other panel to
assist the Supreme Court with the
more mundane cases. Then-Justice
William H. Rehnquist explained at
his 1986 confirmation hearings to be
Chief Justice:
I think if Congress could be persuaded, not ultimately but very
presently, there ought to be a
new national court, frankly
recognized as such, with judges
appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, who
would act as something of a junior
chamber of the Supreme Court,
to hear primarily statutory cases
about which there are presently
conflicts in the circuit[s].
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Photo of Supreme Court Room (in the Capitol), c. 1894, Wittemann Collection, Library of Congress.

A

s we all know, no such dramatic
change occurred. During the
1970s, Congress eliminated mandatory jurisdiction in a number of
types of cases, and in 1988, once
again at the justices’ urging, it eliminated almost all of the remaining
direct appeals to the Supreme Court.
The Court, freed from mandatory
appeals and aggressively applying its
certiorari criteria, has been hearing
argument in fewer and fewer cases a
year. In October Term 2011, for example, the number of cases decided
after briefing and oral argument
reached the historic low of 65 cases.
Not only do these numbers place
the Supreme Court caseload at historic lows, but, as Judge Richard A.
Posner has pointed out, when measured as a proportion of all cases in
the federal judicial system, the case-

load is vanishingly small. He “compare[s] the percentage just of federal court cases in which the Court
granted certiorari in 2004—0.11%
(64 divided by 56,396)—with the
corresponding percentage in 1960—
1.6% (60 divided by 3753)” to find
that “the Court reviewed, in relative
terms, almost 15 times as many federal court cases in 1960 as in 2004.”
Put another way, what Frankfurter
and Landis said in 1928 remains just
as true today:
Perhaps the decisive factor in the
history of the Supreme Court
is its progressive contraction of
jurisdiction. . . . In contrast with
the vast expansion of the bounds
of the inferior federal courts, the
scope of review by the Supreme
Court has been steadily narrowed.
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This “progressive contraction,”
both of mandatory jurisdiction and
of the Court’s exercise of its own discretion to hear cases, has reached a
point where the concerns expressed
today about the Supreme Court’s
workload are unprecedented. Commentators and observers today complain that the Court is not taking
enough cases and that the justices
do not work hard enough. In stark
contrast to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
statements at his confirmation hearings, then-Judge John G. Roberts indicated at his hearings in 2005 that
he thought there was “room for the
Court to take more cases.” Nonetheless, since his confirmation, the
Court has not in fact done so. As already noted, the Court decided only
65 cases after briefing and argument
in October Term 2011. Whether
and how Congress—or the Court itself—will ultimately respond to such
complaints and observations, and
what the next 125 years will bring,
remains to be seen. ◆
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125 YEARS OF LAW BOOKS, 1888–2013
Keith Ann Stiverson
To attain a competent knowledge of the common law . . .
requires steady perseverance, in consequence of the number of
books which beset and encumber the path of the student.

J

					—James Kent

ames Kent wrote those words in
1826, decrying the fact that more
than 600 volumes of English and
American case reports and treatises
had been published, but not many
of them were helpful to the student
seeking an understanding of the
common law. “Steady perseverance,”
to Chancellor Kent, meant setting
aside more books than were consulted,
to take control of the “indigestible
heap of . . . legal authorities.”

The early classes at Chicago-Kent
College of Law were taught in judges’
chambers or in law offices, where
the library usually belonged to the
instructor. Students were often free
to use the books, and sometimes
could borrow them for short periods
of time. The trouble was, everyone
needed the same books. The problem was underscored when Dean
Langdell’s case method became the
dominant means of instruction.
Many volumes of case reports had to
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be replaced year after year, because
the pages where the assigned cases
appeared were simply thumbed to
death by students: the casebook was
born of necessity as much as convenience.
The nineteenth century law
schools that merged to become Chicago-Kent College of Law had very
small collections of books, but students had access to both the city’s
public library (founded in 1872) and
the Newberry Library, a humanities research collection open to the
public that was established in 1887.
The only Chicago law library of any
size was the Chicago Law Institute
Library, which was incorporated by
a small group of lawyers in 1857 to
serve the needs of the city’s growing legal community. The collection
consisted of approximately 7,000
volumes and was housed in the
Cook County Courthouse, where
judges, government employees, and
law students were permitted to use
the collection at no charge, while local practitioners paid an annual fee
of $100. The Law Institute collection
eventually served as the basis for the
Cook County Law Library, which is
now estimated to have more than
300,000 volumes.
Law book publishing in the nineteenth century was initially based
in Albany, New York City, Philadelphia, and Boston, but Chicago also
had a share of the industry, including E.B. Myers & Co., a bookstore/
office for Lawyers Co-operative
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Publishing Company of New York,
and the Illinois Book Exchange,
which provided student textbooks.
The most famous law bookstore of
all was “Callaghan’s Three Miles of
Law Books” at 68 West Washington Street, which eventually became
“Miles and Miles of Law Books” in
later advertisements when its stock
was replaced after the Great Chicago
Fire of 1871. Law books were often
distributed through the publishers’
own bookstores, but Callaghan sold
books from many publishers.
It was in the 1880s that American
law publishers began to create order
out of the “indigestible heap” of law
books that was growing very fast
as the nation and commerce developed. By then, case reports had been
published in the United States for
approximately 100 years, but not in a
systematic way until West’s National
Reporter System began in 1879 with
the Northwestern Reporter. West
was the company that established a
real system for publishing cases, and
then followed that innovation with
the American Digest System. Soon
after the Northwestern Reporter began, West took over and improved
the U.S. Digest, which was previously
published by Little, Brown. West’s
digests and Key Number System
enabled lawyers to find what they
needed in the rapidly-growing sets
of West reporters. The company then
answered the needs of lawyers who
could not afford (and did not want)
the entire national system when it
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began publishing state digests and
reporters.
As West was inventing a system to grapple with the burgeoning case law, Frank Shepard was
inventing the case citator. Shepard’s
Citations began in 1873 as a service
in which adhesive labels were sent
to subscribers who affixed them to
the pages of published case reports
so that the lawyer reading the case
could determine whether the court’s
decision in the case was still “good
law” or had been overturned on appeal. Eventually Shepard developed
a complicated system of abbreviations to indicate the importance and
validity of the case so that a reader
knew if the case could be cited as authority for the statement he wanted
to make. The awkward method of
updating (the gummed labels often
dried up and fell off the pages) didn’t
work very well, so Shepard began
publishing his updating system in
bound volumes keyed to the various
reporters and updated by paperback
supplements. The lawyer who needed
to determine the history or current
status of a case he was reading could
simply check by citation. Finally, in
the 1980s, the Shepard’s Citations
system became the extremely current online citator that lawyers use
today.
One response to the proliferation
of cases was the birth of selective
case reporters with so-called annotations, i.e., an explanation that put
the case(s) in context and provided a

narrative to explain the development
of a particular area of law. It was simply impossible for most lawyers to
keep up with the massive number of
court opinions being published, so
the idea of highlighting and explaining only the leading cases had real
merit. The earliest of the annotated
cases, in the 1880s, were accompanied by short notes; later on, editors
wrote hundreds of pages to explain
the development and current state
of an area of law in multiple jurisdictions.
Another innovation that came
from the law book publishers soon
after the turn of the century was the
specialized loose-leaf service. The
first successful one was published by
Commerce Clearing House in 1913
after ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment created the income
tax. Soon there were other services
covering such subjects as trade regulation and banking, then additional
areas of law as more publishers entered the field. The most useful of the
loose-leaf services brought together in
one publication all of the things that a
practitioner needed: court opinions,
rulings, statutes and regulations, as
well as secondary commentary. Many
of the services were updated weekly,
so the lawyer had less reason to worry
that the information he had was out of
date. In the 1980s, many lawyers who
specialized in a particular area of law
welcomed the new CD-ROM format,
which made it easy for them to carry
around their entire law library.
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Judges were not the only busy
writers; legislatures, both state and
federal, began to pass more laws to
deal with the demands of an increasingly complex industrial society. Session laws were often published only
at the end of a session of the legislature; these, along with the occasional
statutory digest and the various indexes, were not sufficient to make
the material available in a timely
manner. It was increasingly difficult
to piece together the original statute
with all of the amendments of later
years. The Revised Statutes of 1873
was a temporary solution to the
problem, but it was 1926 before the
first publication of the United States
Code. The Code finally gave lawyers
access to federal law in a topical arrangement that was updated. The
official Code is republished every
six years; the most recent edition
consists of more than 200,000 pages.
West began publishing an unofficial
version of the Code right away, in
1927, called the United States Code
Annotated. As everyone knows who
has done research in federal statutes,
West did a faster, better job than the
government of publishing the supplementation necessary to keep the
Code up to date. Many states also
began to compile their statutes into
a topical arrangement with an extensive index. Some of these compilations provided citations to cases
or short annotations of the court
decisions that had construed each
section of the statute.
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No law library could afford to
collect all of the official statutes and
court opinions of Federal and state
governments, let alone the commercial versions of primary material. The
huge wave of secondary legal publications that appeared in response
to the New Deal and the eventual
specialization of the legal profession
made it impossible to build a truly
comprehensive collection. The 600
volumes of case reports that once
annoyed Chancellor Kent continued to multiply until it eventually
became the behemoth that also included thousands of law reviews and
legal newspapers. Luckily, the technology we needed and the uniform
system of legal citation made it possible to control this enormous mass
of material, and to simplify the many
elaborate systems that had been created to help the practitioner find the
law by subject.
The 1970s and 1980s were decades of real achievement in making the whole body of law and the
many secondary sources more readily available in convenient form. The
Lexis database was followed eventually by Westlaw, and the two systems have dominated the market for
online legal research ever since, despite weak challenges from smaller
publishers and from the open access movement. The recent entry of
Bloomberg Law/BNA into the online
market is the first real challenge to
the supremacy of Lexis and Westlaw.
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Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress

Class poem from The Transcript, 1920, Chicago-Kent’s student yearbook, photo by Emily Barney.

A collection of historical books
named The Making of Modern Law
(MOML) was an important contribution to law collections several
years ago that helped to level the field
for new academic law libraries that
had few of the older books. MOML
is a digital collection of more than
twenty thousand nineteenth and
early twentieth century treatises and
other legal documents that are accessible through Chicago-Kent Library’s
online catalog. As one flips through
the pages of this electronic book collection, it is somewhat surprising to
realize that quite often one is looking
at images of a print work that was
once prized by our nineteenth century
faculty and students. An example is
Thayer’s A Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence at the Common Law, published at the turn of the last century

and later added to our library’s print
collection as the 10,510th volume, a
work that is still available on a shelf
in the library, but also accessible as
a full-text e-book that can be read
24/7 by clicking a hyperlink.

N

ow that our huge collections of
print volumes are disappearing
from shelves, what will happen next
to the academic law book collections
that took more than a century to
acquire? One can probably predict
more offsite storage, more e-books,
and more use of print-on-demand
options. What was once known as
“collection development” in the library has undergone radical change.
Acquisition is often temporary, and
research materials are not automatically added to the library’s permanent collection.
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Many law libraries are returning
to their roots to make the historical
materials of their law schools available. For instance, Chicago-Kent
Library is starting a project to preserve the law school’s unique historical collections by placing them
in a digital repository. The images
will reside in the cloud, rather than
moldering away, page by page, in a
dark room. The institutional repository will be the permanent home for
(among other things) the early publications and videos of and about the
law school. We will be able to tell the
descendant of a 1915 graduate where
to find the online class photograph
that includes his great-grandfather.
The nephew of a woman who was
the class poet many years ago can
now read her work online, because
we saved on old student yearbook
before it disintegrated.
Today’s law student may finish
her legal education and then go into
the practice of law without ever using
a print volume, given the twenty-first
century reality that online databases
usually contain everything she needs
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for research, and client files are often
in an electronic knowledge management system rather than in a
print file. But if she returns for a law
school class reunion in a few years,
hoping to relive her triumph at a law
student talent show, we hope we’ll
have a link to the video. ◆
Sources and Further Reading

■ James R. Grossman, et al., eds., The Encyclopedia
of Chicago (2004).
■ Historical Development of the American Lawyer’s
Library, 61 Law Libr. J. 440–462 (1968).
■ Chicago-Kent College of Law, The Transcript
(student yearbook), 1917–.
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the Library at Chicago-Kent. She received
her law degree from Georgetown University Law Center and her M.S. in Library
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125 Years of Innovation
A Chronology of Law and Progress at IIT Chicago-Kent

1888

1894
Ida Platt graduates
with honors, becoming
the first black woman
admitted to the Illinois
bar and the second
woman of color
admitted to practice law
in the United States.
1888
As tutorials evolve
into formal classes,
Chicago College of Law
is established as the
second law school in
Illinois.

1895
Marshall D. Ewell
founds Kent College
of Law, named for
Chancellor James B.
Kent, author of the
influential Commentaries
on American Law.

1891
Emma Baumann
graduates, becoming
the first woman to
earn a law degree from
Chicago College of Law.
1886
Several law clerks
receive tutorials in
Appellate Judge Joseph
M. Bailey’s chambers
to prepare for the newly
instituted Illinois bar
examination.

1900
Chicago College of
Law merges with Kent
College of Law to form
Chicago-Kent College
of Law.

1898/1899
First chapters of
Lambda Epsilon, later
Phi Alpha Delta, the
world’s largest legal
fraternity, begin at
Chicago College of
Law and Kent College
of Law.
1898
Henry Horner
graduates, later
becoming the first
Jewish governor of
Illinois (1933–40).

1912
Chicago-Kent College
of Law moves to rented
space at 116 North
Michigan Avenue, where
it remains for the next
12 years.

1894

Ida Platt graduates with honors
from Chicago College of Law, becoming the
first black woman admitted to the Illinois bar
and the second woman of color admitted to
practice law in the United States.

1949
Richard B. Ogilvie
graduates, later
becoming governor of
Illinois (1969–73).

1924
Chicago-Kent
purchases the building
at 10 North Franklin
Street, which serves
as its home for the
next 50 years.

1951
More than 500 alumni
attend the 65th annual
homecoming luncheon
at the Sherman Hotel.

1942–46
School remains open
during American
involvement in World
War II, with a student
body roughly a third of
its normal size.

1969
Chicago-Kent merges
with Illinois Institute of
Technology, becoming
one of the few U.S. law
schools affiliated with
a technical university.

1923
The Chicago Kent
Review (originally the

Athenaeum Law Bulletin;
now the ChicagoKent Law Review)
begins continuous
publication.

1956
Chicago-Kent’s
Alumni Association
is re-formed, and the
law school building
is expanded and
made handicapped
accessible.

1970
An issue of the
Chicago-Kent Law
Review focuses on
the work of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit,
a theme revisited
annually until 1989.

1976
Chicago-Kent opens
the nation’s first inhouse, fee-generating
law school clinic.

1970–73
Enrollment rises
from 460 to 750
due primarily to the
high percentage of
women entering law
school.

1972
Emerson Blue, the law
school’s first AfricanAmerican professor,
joins the faculty.
1971
Chicago-Kent
establishes its
rigorous trial advocacy
program, where
students gain practical
experience in litigation
techniques.

1971
Mary Lee Leahy, the
law school’s first
woman professor, joins
the faculty.

1978
The Moot Court Honor
Society is founded
to provide practical
skills training in
the foundations of
appellate advocacy.

1978
Chicago-Kent pioneers
the nation’s first threeyear legal research
and writing program,
now emulated at law
schools nationwide.

1977
Chicago-Kent
establishes a
continuing legal
education program.

1976
Chicago-Kent moves
from 10 North Franklin
Street to 77 South
Wacker Drive.

1969

Chicago-Kent merges with
Illinois Institute of Technology,
becoming one of the few
U.S. law schools affiliated with
a technical university.

1976

Chicago-Kent opens the
nation’s first in-house, fee-generating
law school clinic.

1983
Chicago-Kent establishes the
Center for Law and Computers,
becoming the nation’s first law
school to make computers an integral
part of studying law.

1989
Chicago-Kent
establishes a chapter
of the Order of the
Coif, an honorary
scholastic society that
encourages excellence
in legal education.
1992
Chicago-Kent opens
the “law school of the
future” at 565 West
Adams Street, making
the state-of-the-art
building its new home.

1983
Chicago-Kent
establishes the
Center for Law and
Computers, becoming
the nation’s first
law school to make
computers an integral
part of studying law.

1981
Chicago-Kent and
IIT establish a joint
J.D.-M.B.A. program,
the first of many jointdegree options.

1981
Chicago-Kent establishes
the Graduate Program in
Taxation and the Graduate
Program in Financial
Services Law, the first
such LL.M. program in the
United States.

1990
Chicago-Kent is named
among the top “up and
coming” law schools
by U.S. News & World
Report.
1988
The Chicago-Kent
team of Joel Daly ’88,
Lauretta Higgins ’88
and Peter Roskam
’89 wins the 13th
annual National Trial
Competition.

1996
Chicago-Kent is
named Public Interest
Law School of the
Year by the Law
Student Division of
the American Bar
Association.

2000
Chicago-Kent creates
the Institute for Law
and the Humanities
to explore the
relationships between
law and other
humanistic disciplines.

1997
Chicago-Kent launches
a student/faculty
initiative to use
technology to foster
the rule of law in
emerging democracies.

1997
Chicago-Kent and
other academic units
of IIT create the
Institute for Science,
Law & Technology to
evaluate emerging
technologies and their
impact on society.

1996
Chicago-Kent launches
the Institute for Law
and the Workplace,
a national center
focusing on laws that
govern the workplace.

1998
Chicago-Kent receives
the ISBA’s Access
to Justice Special
Recognition Award
for initiatives that
enhance access to
the justice system
for underserved
populations.

1998
Chicago-Kent launches
the Honors Scholars
Program for students
with strong potential to
shape the profession’s
direction.

2002
Chicago-Kent is
awarded the 2002
Diversity Award by
the Council on Legal
Education Opportunity.

2002
The Illinois Technology
Center for Law & the
Public Interest opens
at Chicago-Kent, later
becoming the Center
for Access to Justice &
Technology.

2003

Chicago-Kent alums head the
National Lawyers Association, National
Hispanic Prosecutors Association,
Illinois State Bar Association, Chicago Bar
Association, Women’s Bar Association of Illinois,
Cook County Bar Association, Illinois
Judges Association, and Black Women Lawyers’
Association of Greater Chicago.

2008

Chicago-Kent becomes the first law school to
win both the National Trial Competition and
the National Moot Court Competition in the
same year. The team of Joshua Jones ’08 and
Mark Griffin ’08 took the trial competition
honors; the team of Lalania Gilkey-Johnson ’08,
Joanna Brinkman ’09 and Rachel Moran ’08
took the moot court honors.

2003
Chicago-Kent alums
head the National
Lawyers Association,
National Hispanic
Prosecutors
Association, Illinois
State Bar Association,
Chicago Bar
Association, Women’s
Bar Association of
Illinois, Cook County
Bar Association,
Illinois Judges
Association, and Black
Women Lawyers’
Association of Greater
Chicago.

2003
Chicago-Kent
establishes the
country’s first
LL.M. program
in international
intellectual property
law.

2007
Chicago-Kent and other
IIT units create the
Center for Diabetes
Research and Policy
to advocate for
people with diabetes
and to develop new
treatments and
preventions.
2009
The Chicago-Kent team
of Brody Dawson ’09,
Andrew Booth ’09
and Betsy Gates ’09
wins the 59th annual
National Moot Court
Competition.

2010
The Oyez Project, a
multimedia archive
devoted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and
its work, moves to
Chicago-Kent.

2008
Chicago-Kent becomes
the first law school to
win both the National
Trial Competition and
the National Moot
Court Competition in
the same year.
2007
The Chicago-Kent
team of Keya Rajput
’07 and Joshua Jones
’08 wins the 32nd
annual National Trial
Competition.
2007
Roy C. Palmer ’62 and
Susan M. Palmer establish
the IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law/Roy C.
Palmer Civil Liberties
Prize to honor scholarship
exploring the tension
between civil liberties and
national security.

2010
Chicago-Kent
establishes the Jury
Center, later renamed
after Justice John Paul
Stevens.
2011
Chicago-Kent
establishes its first
endowed chair, named
in honor of Professor
Ralph Brill, and installs
Professor Adrian
Walters of Nottingham
Trent University.

2013
Chicago-Kent opens
the Center for
Empirical Studies of
Intellectual Property
to promote application
of quantitative and
qualitative social
science methods
to questions of
innovation and
creativity.

2012
Chicago-Kent launches
the Institute for
Compliance, dedicated
to preparing students
for careers in financial
compliance.
2012
Chicago-Kent creates the
Center for Information,
Society and Policy to
address privacy and
information security issues
raised by information
technologies.
2011
Chicago-Kent
establishes the
Institute on the
Supreme Court of
the United States to
promote education
about the Court
and its role in our
constitutional system
of government.

2013
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IIT Chicago-Kent Faculty
Susan Johanne Adams
Professor of Legal Research and Writing

Lori B. Andrews
Distinguished Professor of Law

Bernadette Atuahene
Associate Professor of Law

Kimberly D. Bailey
Assistant Professor of Law

Katharine K. Baker
Professor of Law

Felice Batlan
Associate Professor of Law

William A. Birdthistle
Associate Professor of Law

Alexander A. Boni-Saenz
Assistant Professor of Law

Fred P. Bosselman
Professor of Law Emeritus

Ralph Brill
Professor of Law

Evelyn Brody
Professor of Law

Bartram S. Brown
Professor of Law

Gerald Brown
Senior Instructor

Christopher J. Buccafusco
Associate Professor of Law

Howard S. Chapman
Professor of Law

Sungjoon Cho
Professor of Law

Lew Collens
Professor of Law Emeritus and President Emeritus,
Illinois Institute of Technology

Richard J. Conviser
Professor of Law

Daniel T. Coyne
Clinical Professor of Law

Elizabeth De Armond
Professor of Legal Research and Writing

Jonathan Decatorsmith
Clinical Assistant Professor of Law

Rhonda E. de Freitas
Clinical Assistant Professor of Law

Howard C. Eglit
Professor of Law

Suzanne Ehrenberg
Professor of Legal Research and Writing

David A. Erickson
Senior Instructor

David J. Gerber
Distinguished Professor of Law

Douglas Wm. Godfrey
Professor of Legal Research and Writing

Jerry Goldman
Research Professor of Law

Richard J. Gonzalez
Clinical Professor of Law

Sanford N. Greenberg
Professor of Legal Research and Writing

Vivien C. Gross
Clinical Professor of Law
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Philip N. Hablutzel

Harold J. Krent

Professor of Law

Dean and Professor of Law

Sarah K. Harding

Gary S. Laser

Associate Professor of Law

Associate Professor of Law

Vinay Harpalani

Laurie E. Leader

Visiting Assistant Professor of Law

Clinical Professor of Law

Heather F. Harper

Edward Lee

Clinical Assistant Professor of Law

Professor of Law

Edward C. Harris

Martin H. Malin

Associate Professor for
International LL.M. Programs

Professor of Law

Steven L. Harris

Professor of Law

Professor of Law

Todd Haugh
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law

Steven J. Heyman
Professor of Law

Kari L. Aamot Johnson
Professor of Legal Research and Writing

Cherish M. Keller
Assistant Professor of Legal Research
and Writing for LL.M. Programs

Pamela Kentra
Clinical Professor of Law

Richard S. Kling
Clinical Professor of Law

Valerie Gutmann Koch
Visiting Assistant Professor of Law

Edward Kraus
Clinical Professor of Law

Nancy S. Marder
Ana Mendez Mencini
Clinical Assistant Professor of Law

Sheldon H. Nahmod
Distinguished Professor of Law

Henry H. Perritt, Jr.
Professor of Law

Mickie A. Piatt
Associate Professor of Law

César F. Rosado Marzán
Assistant Professor of Law

Mark D. Rosen
Professor of Law

David S. Rudstein
Professor of Law

Christopher W. Schmidt
Assistant Professor of Law

David L. Schwartz
Associate Professor of Law
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Carolyn Shapiro

Keith Ann Stiverson

Associate Professor of Law

Senior Lecturer

Jeffrey G. Sherman

Kent Streseman

Professor of Law Emeritus

Associate Professor of Appellate Advocacy

Stephen D. Sowle

Mary Rose Strubbe

Senior Lecturer

Professor of Legal Research and Writing

Michael I. Spak

Patti Sudendorf

Professor of Law

Instructor

Ronald W. Staudt

A. Dan Tarlock

Professor of Law

Distinguished Professor of Law

Joan E. Steinman

Adrian J. Walters

Distinguished Professor of Law

Ralph L. Brill Professor of Law

Stephanie M. Stern

Richard Warner

Associate Professor of Law

Professor of Law

Margaret G. Stewart

Richard W. Wright

Professor of Law Emeritus

Distinguished Professor of Law
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IIT Chicago-Kent Board of Overseers
Thomas A. Demetrio ’73, Chair

Barry S. Maram ’71

Corboy & Demetrio PC

Shefsky & Froelich Ltd.

Laurel G. Bellows

Michael M. Marick ’82

The Bellows Law Group

Meckler Bulger Tilson Marick & Pearson LLP

Gerald L. Bepko ’65

The Honorable Edward F. Masters ’72

Indiana University School of Law–Indianapolis

Edward F. Masters, Attorney at Law

Peter J. Birnbaum ’83

Steven T. Naumann ’88

Attorneys’ Title Guaranty Fund Inc.

Exelon Corporation

Penny T. Brown ’79

Victoria L. Noonan ’84

Lewis M. Collens

Tishman Speyer Properties

IIT President Emeritus

Steven M. Odre ’77

The Honorable Barbara J. Disko ’73

Ward Parkinson ’97

Circuit Court of Cook County (retired)

Ovonyx Inc.

Vincent L. DiTommaso ’82

The Honorable Ilana
Diamond Rovner ’66

DiTommaso & Lubin

Ronald H. Filler
New York Law School

Michael P. Galvin ’78
Harrison Street Capital LLC

Jeffery T. Grade (B.S. ’66)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Robert M. Sarnoff ’68
Sarnoff & Baccash

John R. Schmidt
Mayer Brown LLP

J & L Hospitality Group LLC

Bernard R. Tresnowski ’98

Harold S. Handelsman

Priscilla A. (Pam) Walter

The Pritzker Organization

Frances P. Kao ’92
Anne G. Kimball

Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Robert J. Washlow ’70
Bay West Management LLC

Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP

Degee Wilhelm ’02

Theodore L. Koenig ’83

Joan C. Wing ’74

Monroe Capital LLC

George A. Zelcs ’79
Korein Tillery
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IIT Chicago-Kent Alumni Board of Directors
Paul A. Miller ’00, President

Barbara D. Klein ’78

Office of the Special Deputy Receiver

Barbara D. Klein & Associates

Tarek A. Fadel ’03, Past President

Bruce M. Kohen ’79

AdaptiGroup LLC

Retired

Michael Brown ’83

Charles J. Masters ’74

Clark Hill PLC

Charles J. Masters Ltd.

The Honorable Eileen O’Neill Burke ’90

James J. Morici Jr. ’79

Circuit Court of Cook County

Morici Figlioli & Associates

Kevin Connor ’87

Mary T. Nicolau Smith ’85

Illinois Department of Financial &
Professional Regulation

Smith/Nicolau PC

Terrence T. Creamer ’90

Peck Bloom LLC

Franczek Radelet PC

Ann M. Cresce ’94
Hong Kong Mercantile Exchange

Scott M. Curran ’01
William J. Clinton Foundation

Symeon K. Davis ’97

Kerry R. Peck ’78
Jason Sposeep ’03
Schiller DuCanto & Fleck LLP

Denise Y. Staniec ’84
Law Offices of Denise Y. Staniec

Alexander Kakabadse ’14
SBA Representative

Hobson Bernardino & Davis LLP

Karen Dixon ’97
Meckler Bulger Tilson Marick & Pearson LLP

Paul J. Ferak ’00
Greenberg Traurig

William T. Gibbs ’04
Corboy & Demetrio PC

Robert A. Heap ’83
Kuhn Heap & Monson

Seth A. Herkowitz ’07, MBA ’07
Steve’s Deli

ex-officio/presidents emeriti
Daniel S. Kirschner ’98
Corboy & Demetrio PC

John G. Locallo ’86
Amari & Locallo

Kevin E. O’Reilly ’92
Law Offices of Kevin E. O’Reilly

Robert A. Surrette ’97
McAndrews, Held & Malloy Ltd.
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